Showing posts with label rhetoric. Show all posts
Showing posts with label rhetoric. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 05, 2008

Revising my work: Evelina essay

This essay I am particularly proud of. Written for Emily Allen's course on the British Novel. Some typos, and more close reading needed. Might need to insert some Blair.


A Good Woman Learning to Speak Well: Speech and Argumentation in Evelina

Not long after her first excursions into London social circles, the title character of Evelina writes to her guardian Mr. Villars: “But, really, I think there ought to be a book, of the laws and customs à-la-mode, presented to all young people, upon their first introduction into pubic company” (Burney 83). As arguments, novels represent female characters with given traits in a positive or negative light, thus promoting or discouraging certain behaviors in readers—Evelina’s book exists, and she is one of many who are presenting to young readers the customs of polite society. In contextualizing the novels’ rise as both a cause and effect of the rise of a middle class, critics such as Michael McKeon, Nancy Armstrong, and J. Paul Hunter argue that novels act as what Kenneth Burke calls "strategic answers, stylized answers" (The Philosophy of Literary Form 1). Novels offer both reader and writer a symbolic means to react in an uncertain situation. The female heroine of Evelina and other eighteenth-century novels negotiate for the reader this uncertain environment and eventually arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.
If we take these as our premises, then we must next ask what behavior is being promoted through the female heroines. McKeon, Hunter, and Armstrong have argued that the target behavior is either an appropriate sexuality or domestication by pointing to the characterization and plot development in these novels. The domesticated or tamed female has been described as modest or decorous in her actions, but apart from elocution, little has been written about women’s speech, particularly argumentative speech.
Patricia Howell Michaelson’s Speaking Volumes: Women, Reading, and Speech in the Age of Austen takes up the issue of women’s speech as represented in Austen’s novels, and the resulting social action that representation incurred. Michaelson is concerned with sociolinguists’ interpretation of “gendered language” as a question of “bad,” submissive silence as opposed to a strategic ethos of silence (4-6). Silence, for Michaelson, is not necessarily a sign of submission—it may be a rhetorical choice. If rhetoric has been, since Quintilian, defined partly as “a good man speaking well,” how are we to understand the utterances, or lack thereof of good women? While Michaelson studies the dialogue and conversational aspects of Austen’s novels, however, I am interested in the ways the novels describe and thus prescribe (or argue for) an appropriate female rhetor through these conversations..
Written by Frances Burney in 1778, Evelina seems to be particularly concerned with speech, more so than earlier novels. Evelina, with its central female narrator learning how to navigate various discourse conventions, prescribes for its female audience a way of arguing that embodies politeness, wit, and, above all, ethos over pathos. The history of rhetoric has been a history of conflict over the relative importance of these elements. In the eighteenth century, Wilbur Howell argues, the influence of Ramus placed concerns of ethos and elocution over logic, which was completely removed from rhetoric. When Mrs. Selwyn says “But for this observation […] I protest I should have supposed that a peer of the realm and an able logician were synonymous terms” (361) she is referring not to a connection to philosophical logics, but to Aristotelian “logic,” which we now call rhetoric. Those who spoke of “rhetoric” were most often working with Cicero’s reading of the Greek rhetoricians (Howell 75). While “rhetoric” as we now use it would not have been involved with epistemological questions or dialectical constructions, Howell claims that these ideas were debated in the 18th century, just as a separate category. Cicero’s popularity might have saved rhetoric from descending completely into elocution; the 18th Ciceronians, according to Howell, interpreted Cicero’s rhetoric as
the chief art of discourse, [which] consisted of all the principles and precepts which regulated all speaking and all writing addressed to popular audiences on occasions when some doctrine had to be taught, some thesis proved, some great achievement or great man celebrated for public enlightenment, or some course of action proposed as the best response to the facts of the case and to the human interests and feelings concerned. (77)
This last concern of eighteenth century rhetoric is what we find to be the preoccupation of Evelina: How, the novel asks, should women respond to “the facts” of a case of conflicts of interest? To revise Quintillian, how do we know when a good woman is speaking well?
Evelina provides possible strategic and stylized answers to this question in two ways. First, there is the epistolary nature of the novel; Evelina is writing to her father, being careful to omit some details, and to “delicately” phrase others. In first asking Mr. Villars for permission to go to London, Evelina hedges her arguments with deferrals to Mr. Villars’s authority: “They are to make a very short stay in town. The captain will meet them in a day or two. Mrs. Mirvan and her sweet daughter both go;--what a happy party! Yet I am not very eager to accompany them: at least, I shall be very well contented to remain where I am, if you desire I should” (25). In her appeal, Evelina first convinces Mr. Villars of her safety (the captain will appear shortly, and the Mirvan women go often anyway) before submitting, however grudgingly.
Evelina censors for her father several scenes, first by not quoting herself directly, and secondly by simply omitting events. Upon discovering the stranger in their coach is none other than Madame Duval, her grandmother, Evelina writes “But I will not shock you with the manner of her acknowledging me, or the bitterness, the grossness—I cannot otherwise express myself—with which she spoke of those unhappy past transactions you have so pathetically related to me” (54). Evelina’s reluctance to repeat Madame Duval’s “gross” speech shows that she has already a strong education in what is appropriate speech for women.
Michaelson categorizes this type of polite, censorious speech as one of three techniques Austen teaches us: “[Pride and Prejudice] begins […] with an example of what not to do in conversation, with Mr. Bennet’s refusal to participate in the turn-taking cooperatives we expect” (203). Madame Duval may take part in the turn-taking, but other discourse conventions of late eighteenth century England elude her, and Evelina is careful to show Mr. Villars that she knows that her grandmother’s speech is not acceptable. Michaelson sees similar comments in Pride and Prejudice on what not to say: “Earlier, formal modes of conversation are ridiculed in the obsequious flattery of Mr. Collins, who not only constantly spouts fawning phrases, but actually plans them out ahead of time” (204). In Austen, the “polite converser actively smoothes interactions and feelings”—and does not speak with “impertinence” (204-205); her novels prescribe this action. Evelina’s letters, in their censoring, show readers what not to say.
Evelina’s original insistence on omitting or glossing over for Mr. Villars the inappropriate speeches does not mean that Evelina is necessarily arguing for complete silence on the part of a female rhetor; instead, we must see Evelina’s letters in terms of the structure of the novel itself. Each of the three volumes provides Evelina opportunities to practice and perfect her writing and speech, and each repetition of events shows her improving her responses. This type of structure is itself an argument; Burke calls it a “repetitive form”: “Repetitive form is the consistent maintaining of a principle under new guises. It is restatement of the same thing in different ways” (125). Evelina restates common social interactions—dances, theater, walking in gardens, courtship—in each of its three volumes, with slight shifts in characters and context.
While Evelina’s rhetorical moves in her letters show us an increasing sophistication of discourse analysis and response, the speech she represents in those letters is perhaps more important in that this representation is more obvious in its prescription. The three-volume structure of Evelina provides, as stated above, a qualitative progression for readers to measure and analyze Evelina’s education (and thus her speech). Readers know that the early arguments Evelina makes are less appropriate or mature than those appearing later. The “young” Evelina is not to be emulated, but is to be used as a starting point for further development.
In the novel, “argument” is difficult to separate from daily speech; we could argue that all speech is an argument of sorts, even if it is just an argument for the character of the speaker. In Evelina, much of the speech represented directly is connected to conflict, as these comprise the interesting parts of Evelina’s life. “Arguments” are all around Evelina, whether in the form of serious conflict, or mere negotiation of opinions of where to spend the evening. The early arguments Evelina finds herself in are largely out of her control; she does not yet have the skills to navigate the discourse community of “the world” outside Mr. Villars’ home. For most of her arguments, then, Evelina is silenced; at her first dance, she finds herself unable to even speak to Lord Orville: “He begged to know if I was not well? You may easily imagine how much I was confused. I made no answer, but hung my head, like a fool, and looked on my fan” (32). Later, she is embarrassed by her silence: “It now struck me, that he was resolved to try whether or not I was capable of speaking on any subject. This put so great a constraint upon my thoughts, that I was unable to go further than a monosyllable, and no even so far, when I could possibly avoid it” (34). Her lack of knowledge about “the world” prevents her from making an appropriate response.
Current-traditional rhetoric and most sociolinguistic theories find silence to be the most submissive position to be in an argument. Vocalization, as Michaelson recounts, has traditionally been given precedence over even strategic silence, and “Moreover, this dominant metaphor has encouraged us to pity, ignore, or discount the many generations of women for whom silence represented a potentially useful strategy” (3). Silence is the position of the marginalized, and Evelina is continually silencing herself-- in the first half of the novel her silence is the submissive, powerless silence we usually associate with that metaphor, but in the second half we see a strategic silence emerge. The presence of silence is not surprising; in tracing the history of desire in the novel, Nancy Armstrong argues that “one cannot distinguish the production of the new female ideal either from the rise of the novel or fro the rise of the new middle classes in England” (8) and that ideal featured a woman who spoke to few, and certainly did not participate in public, policy forming arguments (Armstrong 18-20). In recent years, rhetoricians have focused less on conditions of silencing, however, and more on tactics for overcoming marginalization, even through silence. Still, it is important to remember that Evelina is not representing and prescribing the characteristics of all women’s speech. Evelina is herself a middle-class white woman whose story is an educational tool for other middle-class white women in England—what Kenneth Burke calls a “symbol” (Counter-Statement 152) which gives a “pattern of existence” (157), a template of behavior for readers to follow.
One such “representative anecdote” for speech and silence can be found in Evelina’s first conflict with Sir Clement Willoughby. Sir Clement is unrelenting in his pursuit of Evelina, who lies to him by saying she already has a dance partner. Evelina attempts to escape Sir Clement’s, but he continues his advances:
“You do me justice,” (cried he, interrupting me) “yes, I do indeed improve upon acquaintance; you will hereafter be quite charmed with me.”
“Hereafter, Sir, I hope I shall never--“
“O hush!—hush!—have you forgot the situation in which I found you?” (47).
Sir Clement interrupts Evelina even as she attempts to politely refuse. To escape the “raillery,” Evelina pretends that Lord Orville is her partner. Upon reaching the safety of Mrs. Mirvan, Evelina quits speaking all together: “I had not strength to make my mortifying explanation;--my spirits quite failed me, and I burst into tears” (49).This silencing, Sara Mills points out, has been the topic of most sociolinguistic studies of gender, it has become a trope of the gendered speech discussion to the point where analysis has been stalled at the male-voiced/female-silenced binary. Like Michaelson, Mills finds fault with the earlier sociolinguistic analysis that posited a normatively polite (evasive) and inoffensive female speech, “characterized as deviant in relation to a male norm which, by implication, was characterized as being direct, confident and straight-talking” (Mills 5). For Mills, this characterization is not necessarily the best binary to follow, since “many of these features, particularly those associated with women's over-politeness and deference, are in fact characteristic of feminine rather than female speech, that is, a stereotype of what women's speech is supposed to be” (5 emphasis added). It is precisely this prescription of behavior that Evelina invokes; however, the majority of Evelina’s polite silences appear early in the narrative, when Evelina’s “discourse competence” (Mills 4) is still unformed.
Silence is, above all, a phenomenon of power structures. Julia Allen and Lester Faigley analyze the various ways that those in the margins try to overcome that silence or work within it. For them, the written discourse of novels, poems, and even music can teach methods of subversion (143). Working with Burke’s idea of “perspective by incongruity,” Allen and Faigley argue that replacing direct argument with the metaphorical or euphemistic to be one way the marginalized can speak: “To say the unsayable, writers have often substituted one safer representation for another more definitive one” (164). Narrative, Allen and Faigley suggest, is one way to say the unsayable, to provide a different kind of “rationality” (167). Evelina is not completely silenced; she replaces her silence with talking about her silence in letters—letters which are compiled by “the editor” (Burney) and transmitted to readers.
Despite this early, silenced speech, the majority of Evelina represents Evelina’s own arguments as the correct approach for a middle-class woman. The second volume contrasts the way Evelina handles confrontational speech with that of her less-savvy cousins and grandmother. Her conflicts with Clement and her cousins provide ample opportunity for her to create and give arguments. Without the protection of Mrs. Mirvan, Evelina must speak for herself, and when she does, she begins to discover which techniques are more effective.
Such rhetorical examination was running strong in the eighteenth century; while the “current-traditional” theorists (Hugh Blair, George Campbell, and Richard Whately) formulated rhetoric as a scientific set of rules to follow, still others focused their attentions on elocution. Women rhetors, however, had the most to gain or lose from the stabilization of rhetorical theory and practice, and several novelists, Jane Donawerth argues, used their novels and other fiction as a place to revise, parody, or reject outright the tradition that Howell describes. Donawerth points to Maria Edgeworth’s “Essay on the Noble Science of Self-Justification,” in which “Edgeworth mockingly parodies and transforms the techniques of traditional rhetoric and thus resists not only the repression of women’s voices and powers in marriage, but also the dangerous potential for manipulation in rhetoric” (245). Edgeworth, like many composition theorists today, knows that the restraints and formulas of current-traditional rhetoric are dangerous not because they are ineffective, but because they are too effective; they allow no room for other voices, they posit a singular, empowered ethos, and they categorize their audiences absolutely (leaving women always as passive, ready to be told the “truth” by male orators). Edgeworth challenges that rhetoric, however, through satire: “In her treatment of wives’ defenses of themselves from husbands’ blame, she parodies the categories of voice taught in elocution, for her shrew has mastered the ‘petulant, the peevish, and the sullen tones’” (Donawerth 245). Even theories of elocution, which was rarely concerned with the content or evidence of an utterance, gendered the speaker, prescribing a particular pitch and thus a particular version of the feminine. Women rhetoricians were in constant dialogue with the newly established theories and while neither Evelina nor Burney does not exactly theorize argumentation, the text does, by giving a representation of appropriate female speech and its consequences, promote a certain version of rhetorical practice. In the second and third volumes, as Evelina perfects her argumentation skills, we learn with her what good argumentation looks like.
In Volumes II and III we are shown various forms of argument and speech Politeness and “decorum” are shown as important to good speech when Evelina comments on the Branghtons’ language. Unlike Evelina, her cousins have no faculty of “sentiment,” the ability to engage in “moral reflection [and] a rational opinion” (Todd 7). Sentimental women (and, to a lesser extent, men) were to have compassion and pity for all, which was then reflected in their speech (19). Sensibility is the outward expression of being affected by pathos, and thus becomes a property of ethos: If one is not swayed to sympathy, one’s character comes into question (Michaelson 186). Evelina is convinced of her cousins’ faults because of the way they speak. Mrs. Duval has none of the decorum that Evelina comes to have by the end of the novel. Evelina comments on the coarseness of her introduction: “The manner in which Madame Duval was pleased to introduce me to this family, extremely shocked me. ‘Here, my dears,’ said she, ‘here’s a relation you little thought of; but you must know my poor daughter Caroline had a child after she run away from me[….]” (70). Madame Duval speaks frankly about Evelina’s private legitimacy problem within seconds of the introduction, causing Evelina to be “shocked.”
The Branghton sisters are no better: Evelina’s letter portrays their conversation as idle “ceremony” (71). Their brother even comments on their gossip and chatter. When asked what the women will find to say to one another, he replies indignantly: “‘Say!’ cried young Branghton, ‘O, never you think of that, they’ll find enough to say, I’ll be sworn. You know the women are never tired of talking’” (188). In addition to being empty talkers, the Branghton sisters are, in Evelina’s opinion “abrupt” and in “want of affection, and good-nature” (172). Additionally, Evelina finds that their conversation “manifested equally their folly and their want of decency” (172). The lack of sentiment and sensibility displayed by Evelina’s relatives gives Evelina the opportunity to comment on such indecency, and to point out to the readers the differences between her own mistakes, which are “never willfully blameful” and which she is always embarrassed by, and the sisters’ brash conversation which they do not notice is uncouth.
Sensibility is also important to understanding theories of rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; what we now call identification and pathos became the central terms when describing how to “move” an audience. Evelina’s own sensibility endears her to Orville, even when he is suspicious of her meetings with Mr. Macartney: “‘My dearest Miss Anville,’ he said, taking my hand, ‘I see, and I adore the purity of your mind, superior as it is to all little arts, and all apprehensions of suspicion’” (364). Evelina’s purity from the “arts” of speech and rhetoric is a better argument than any she could—and tries to—give him to explain Mr. Macartney’s presence.
Evelina’s pathetic moments with Madam Duval show sensibility, but this is not used when arguing. Instead, sensibility and sentiment appear as part of non-argumentative speech. When Sir Clement and the Captain “rob” Madame Duval, Evelina pleads with Sir Clement to have pity: “—pray leave me, pray go to the relief of Madame Duval,--I cannot bear that she should be treated with such indignity” (147). Despite her pity and appeal, Evelina is still silenced quickly by Sir Clement’s relentless appeals of his own, and he interrupts her argument to stop his “schemes” to hurt Madame Duval, and instead Clement asks her to “be less averse to trusting” him (148). Evelina is not yet able to turn the conversation in her favor or to cause change.
Evelina’s character as expressed in her arguments begins to provide the basis of her speech. Because of the commonly held beliefs about the “nature” of women, a good woman speaker, to be heard at all, must adhere to the rules of sensibility. Her sensible character is as much a part of her argument as the syllogisms she can provide for evidence. Michaelson finds this to be especially true in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, in which Elizabeth “privileges ethos as a means of persuasion, while Darcy insists on logos” (Michaelson 184). In her letter to Lord Orville explaining that she had nothing to do with the Branghton sisters untactfully asking for his carriage, Evelina begins by announcing her shame and “shock.” By arguing that “I cannot forbear writing a few lines, to clear myself from the imputation of an impertinence which I blush to be suspected of” (250), Evelina constructs for herself the appropriate ethos for the situation. Her shame points to her understanding of what is appropriate, and the blush she describes is a sign of her true modesty. Her language is formal, as she knows that it is improper for a woman to begin correspondence with a man so suddenly, and the letter is short. She signs the letter as “Your Lordship’s most humble servant” (250); not as a friend or acquaintance. Her signature places distance in their relationship, the very subject of contention that is the exigency for her letter. Even her signature must be constructed with attention to ethos.
Evelina’s chooses her words carefully in this section because of how much is at stake for her. Norman Page provides a framework for understanding the role of character in speech in the novel. Although Page, like many others, focuses on representations of dialect in the novel, he does make a claim for a connection between the representation of dialogue in general and the presentation of character. Because we cannot see the character as we would on stage, Page argues, we must gather character information from the way the character speaks. In some novels, a dialect tells us about the character’s class; for others, word choice and conversational techniques provide characterization (Page 110). A character’s character is in part determined by his or her rhetorical understanding.
In Volume III we are given yet another counter example to Evelina’s newly acquired rhetorical sense. Mrs. Selwyn is perhaps the best female rhetor in the novel, but the novel’s attitude toward her “artistic” talents implies that she is perhaps too good at arguing. Sir Clement, the subject of many of Mrs. Selwyn’s comments, argues that she “afforded some relief from […] formality, but the unbounded license of her tongue—“ but is cut off by Evelina’s defense of her temporary guardian (343). Mrs. Selwyn is never polite, but is witty in her short, sarcastic comments and rational in her longer arguments to Mr. Belmont. To convince Mr. Belmont that Evelina is his daughter, she first meets with him briefly alone. When her arguments are ineffective, Mrs. Selwyn, knowing her audience, brings Evelina with her. She reasons that if Mr. Belmont is firm in his conviction, then he at least should “have no objection to seeing this young lady?” (372). Unable to find a reason why he should fear a young woman, Mr. Belmont assents, and Mrs. Selwyn wins the argument.
While the silent, uneducated response is not advocated by the novel, neither is the “force” (369) of Mrs. Selwyn. Evelina’s own comments lead us to believe that we are not to follow in Mrs. Selwyn’s footsteps: although she defends against Sir Clement’s criticism, in her asides to her father, her opinion is quite clear: “And now, my dear Sir, I have a conversation to write, the most interesting to me, that I ever heard. The comments and questions with which Mrs. Selwyn interrupted her account, I shall not mention; for they are such as you may very easily suppose” (345). Evelina’s father knows Mrs. Selwyn well enough to imagine what the woman might have said, but more importantly, Evelina does not find the comments worthy of copying down. To Evelina, the humorous and critical remarks do not count as necessary to the story, nor do they make for even an interesting aside in a letter.
As a contrast to Mrs. Selwyn, we are shown Evelina’s most effective argument—one in which she does not have to say a word. It is argument by face and demeanor. When Evelina meets her birthfather for the first time, Mr. Belmont is not convinced by the logical arguments and wits of Mrs. Selwyn. Evelina in arguing for her legitimacy is most effective when silent; Mr. Belmont exclaims “Yes, yes” and acknowledges Evelina is the true daughter of Caroline Evelyn. Throughout his shocked speech, Evelina remains “Speechless, motionless,” and yet has managed to “set [his] brain on fire” (372). Her best argument is simply her presence.
Evelina’s ethos comes from her heritage. There is nothing she can do to either improve or ruin it; her face, not her reasoning enables her to live a middle-class fairytale. Still, argumentation in this novel is not left entirely to the parentage of the rhetor. There are definite “bad” rhetorics, in the form of the Branghtons and the bad ethos of Mrs. Selwyn. From this, we can extrapolate what the novel recommends. At the very least, speakers should not be silenced when silence is an ineffective response to inappropriate proposals (like that of Sir Clement). Speakers should also speak politely, but provide enough information so that mistakes are not later made. Finally, speakers should provide an ethos appropriate to the situation; Evelina’s character as her mother’s daughter is the only appeal that will sway Mr. Belmont, and Mrs. Selwyn’s character as harsh and railing prevents her from being seen as the witty, intelligent speaker she is. Evelina does not provide a complete picture of a good female rhetor, but it does provide anecdotal tips to those about to be introduced into “pubic company.”
Works Cited
Allen, Julia and Lester Faigley. "Discursive Strategies for Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument." Rhetoric Review. 14 (1995):142-172.
Armstrong, Nancy. Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987.
Burke, Kenneth. Counter-Statement. 3nd Ed. Berkley: University of California Press, 1968.
Burke, Kenneth. The Philosophy of Literary Form. Berkley: University of California Press, 1974.
Burney, Francis. Evelina. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Howell, Wilbur Samuel. Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
Michaelson, Patricia Howell. Speaking Volumes: Women, Reading, and Speech in the Age of Austen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Mills, Sara. “Discourse Competence: Or How to Theorize Strong Women Speakers.” Hypatia 7 (Spring 1992): 4-17.
Page, Norman. Speech in the English Novel. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988.
Todd, Janet. Sensibility: An Introduction. London: Methuen, 1986.

Revising my work: BSG essay

Written two years ago, with some parts I'd like to incorporate into my dissertation. Perhaps for publication?


Starting with the End: Battlestar Galactica and Apocalyptic Narration

Early Science Fiction (SF) television had few successes—The Twilight Zone, The Outer Limits, Star Trek—and many (some memorable) failures—Space: 1999, Red Dwarf, Buck Rogers in the 25th Century, and Battlestar Galactica to name a few. These failures have, for the most part, fallen into obscurity. In 2003, however, the SciFi Channel produced a mini-series based on, but not identical to, the original Battlestar Galactica (BSG), spending the four hour special focusing on the first days of the apocalypse that frames the show. The miniseries was so popular that it led SciFi to create its own version of the 1970s series; unlike that series, BSG: 2003 received a Peabody award in 2006 for its “parallax considerations of politics, religion, sex, even what it means to be ‘human’” (http://www.peabody.uga.edu), and it has continued to show strong ratings.

BSG: 2003 raises two questions: How do you narrate the apocalypse in a pleasing way? And why would anyone want to “read” a dystopic future in the first place? Gary Wolfe, in his structural analysis of post-apocalyptic novels, admits that “Although in one sense the very notion of beginning a narrative with a climactic holocaust seems perverse, especially if the underlying tone of the novel is going to be optimistic, such a fantasy is very much in keeping with traditions of millenarian thought” (3). The relationship between “millenarian” thought—the dystopian, apocalyptic attitudes that appear during times of social uncertainty--and our own postmodern condition is such that a television show that “perversely” begins at the end is not only unsurprising, but well-accepted and hailed by critics. BSG:2003, as a product of our postmodern consumer culture, narrates the chaos and trauma of a future apocalypse while remaining a pleasurable text.

The possibility of narrating the future has been taken up by Fredric Jameson in his latest book Archaeologies of the Future. The name of the book points to the fundamental paradox of science fiction: any written artifact tells of events that have already passed or are currently passing for the author, and yet for the SF reader, these events belong to a time other than his or her own, a time that has yet to come. Scifi, as many theorists assert, is never “about” that future time, however. All “good” SF is in parable form, an insight into the reader’s present (Suvin 5). Narrating an imagined future that is really the present in disguise will always be a complex venture when done well, and, as Jameson acknowledges, that when attempting to outline the formal aspects of Utopia (literary and otherwise), one must “confront the way in which the secession of the Utopian imagination from everyday empirical Being takes the form of a temporal emergence and a historical transition” (85). Utopias are never present, either spatially or temporally, and therefore have a built in reliance on cause and effect relations: if we read a utopian fiction, then we will see our world as imperfect, else we will never reach the heaven on earth represented in the text. Jamison reminds us that the perfection of any written or imagined utopia, however, is limited by human imagination (288), and even the imagined perfect future is only the present reworked.

What BSG: 2003 excels at is making the imagined future not only an easily recognizable reworked present, but making that presence present, immediate, and highly realistic. However, the popularity of the revised series cannot be attributed only to this high level of realism made possible through sophisticated special effects; we must also consider the series as a narrative that takes into account viewer desires for a literal revelation (in Greek, “apocalypse”). What follows is an exploration of what allows this story of the end of history to be pleasurable. I argue that BSG: 2003 uses the relationship between the story of our future as its being told and the viewers’ present time and narrative order to both sate and inflame viewer desires for revelation of the story of apocalypse. Specifically, the series uses an untold “story” that is uncovered through a fragmented and veiling “discourse” that appeals to verisimilitude, and thus the viewers‘ sense of import.

The Postmodern Social Scene
M. Keith Booker responds to Jameson’s earlier work on postmodernity by examining a strand of postmodernity he calls the “post-utopian” or the fall of utopian imagination (Americas 4). For Booker, the post-utopian is most readily seen in SF, but he implies that the post-utopian condition has been overlooked because of the low-culture status of SF: “[…I]f Jameson is right about the status of postmodernism as a cultural dominant, then postmodern characteristics should be displayed in a wide range of cultural products, not just in The Recognitions or Naked Lunch” (Americas 3). As such, Booker takes as his examples popular SF texts from Ray Bradbury and the like. Jameon’s latest work does in fact address science fiction as part of the postmodern condition, citing everything from Ursula K LeGuin’s The Dispossessed to Star Trek, finding that even the wildest u/dystopias are nothing more than “chimeras” made up of pieces of our own time and ideologies (24).

The rhetoric of modern post-apocalyptic fictions depends on this tension between what is knowable (the present) and what can only be posited from our current conditions (the future). It also, however, plays on our fears of the collapse of the social order, creating a desire for fortunetelling so that we can brace for the trauma to come. By appealing to the audience's desire for knowledge and control of the future, BSG: 2003 and other exemplary SF texts invoke the "Utopian impulses," that occur when we are shown a world different from our own, as Jameson reading Ernst Bloch argues (xii). While there is a sense in Jameson‘s work that all imagined worlds lead to “utopian” desires, we should also note that many postmodern texts are aware of those impulses, and take them into account, creating the “dystopian” end of fictions of social criticism. Jameson’s focus on the utopianism is understandable--after all, many ideal communities have been set forth around a general desire for unity, peace, and equality. Few “real world” communities (although we might here name a few religious cults or militias) base themselves around a sense of an impending apocalypse. Hope is a far more pleasurable and sustaining organizing principle.

What Jameson fails to comment on is how these texts--not the communities themselves or the ideas they are based on--work with their readers to produce a pleasurable experience. It is easy to see that utopian (and dystopian) texts show us a reflection of our own world and ask us identify with the fictional extrapolation of our current conditions, but to do so effectively and with enough rhetorical force, the texts must be pleasurable enough to maintain the reader involvement needed to make the argument. BSG:2003 accomplishes this by making the future almost hyper-present, using the cinematic techniques that create reader interest and pleasure in the immediate here and now.

Starting at the End: Revising the Apocalyptic Structure
The real-time feel—the “documentary style” that the writers and directors of the series say makes BSG distinctive-- of the series also shows us our struggles with forecasting the future, with giving dystopic warnings to ourselves retroactively (“33 Commentary”). If BSG is a history of the future, it is one meant to warn us of our own pending apocalypse—but it can only show us what we already know and imagine. The discourse and rhetoric of apocalyptic stories is limited by our past and present.

Film theories and theories of narratology provide a way for us to understand the pleasure of a rhetorically successful apocalyptic text. BSG: 2003 avoids the pitfalls of its predecessors by forgoing a linear narrative in favor of a discourse which reveals as it conceals, never allowing the viewer to gain complete access to the complete story—the events of the apocalypse as they happened. Peter Brooks, echoing Russian Formalist theories, describes this as the difference between “story” and “discourse” or fabula and sjuzet (Brooks 12). Wolfe’s model of the structure of post-apocalyptic fiction has five parts. The original series was half space western, half space opera, with Star Wars as its implicit model, both stylistically and in narrative. The program was popular at first, but as the novelty of the special effects and space travel itself wore off, the show’s ratings dropped. It could not sustain its intrigue with “flat characters and [a] lack of imaginative plot” (Booker TV 89).

The new and improved version takes only the basic plot from the original, leaving the “western” feel behind in exchange for a documentary style and theme. While post-apocalyptic novels have a structure that can, in fact, be seen as a frontier story according to Wolfe, as a television seires, BSG deviates from the five part formula that Wolfe describes. In novels, there are commonly five large stages of action: (1) the experience or discovery of the cataclysm; (2) the journey through the wasteland created by the cataclysm; (3) settlement and establishment of a new community; (4) the re-emergence of the wilderness as antagonist; and (5) a final, decisive battle or struggle to determine which values shall prevail in the new world. (Wolfe 8)

Battlestar Galactica has most of these elements, but has rearranged the pieces and, as Wolfe allows, “The formula may be varied in many ways, with some elements expanded to fill nearly the whole narrative, others deleted, and new ones added” (8). While the miniseries can be seen as covering at least partially stages one through three, the series which begins with the episode titled “33” could be located at stage four.

The four hour miniseries briefly establishes the logic of the diegesis and the premises for the show: Humans have settled on twelve planets known as the “Colonies” and were living in peace and prosperity until their artificially intelligent machines, the Cylons, turned on them and began a civil war. The miniseries picks up forty years after “the Cylon wars” in the middle of a cease fire. We are introduced to the seven main characters (the newly instated President Laura Roslin; the Vice President and traitor Gaius Baltar; Baltar’s Cylon lover, “Number Six;” the captain of the Galactica, Adama; and his second in command Colonel Tigh; Adama’s son, Lee “Apollo” Adama; and pilots Sharon “Boomer” Valery and Kara “Starbuck” Thrace) and several of the minor characters on the capital planet Caprica before the Cylons attack, bringing a nuclear holocaust to all twelve planets simultaneously. The miniseries focuses on the crew of the dilapidated old Battlestar Galactica which manages to escape the attack because its outdated technology isn’t prone to Cylon viruses. The Galactica and a small fleet of the surviving military and civilian ships begin a long fight for the survival of the human race and the (relative) maintenance of civil order. When the miniseries ends, the “ragtag” fleet seems to have momentarily escaped the Cylons and are searching for a mythical 13th colony known as Earth.

When the series itself begins, the audience is dropped right into the middle of a new crisis (the Cylons have found them) without any explanation of what has happened in between. The first season focuses on the survival of the crew in the “wilderness” of space, with the Cylons on their heels—a continual chase scene. This chase is anchored by two main plot threads that eventually become linked: President Laura Roslin’s piecing together the lost history of the 12 colonies and her lost memory of the Cylon attack, and Gaius Baltar’s struggle with his betrayal of the Colonies. While these threads are the show’s main, controlling plot, as they were in the (slightly different) 1970s series, the events move slowly, giving viewers time to become invested in the seven “main” characters emotional developments and the slow revelation of what really happened the day the Cylons attacked.

The structure as I have described it here fits in with Wolfe’s fourth stage, but with an important change: the events of the previous three stages are returned to and retold again and again, as the characters come to terms with the trauma of the apocalypse. The focus is not on the events themselves, but, as creator Ron Moore says, on the “humanity” of the situation; we do not watch for the action, but for the characters’ re-actions.

In part, the series is successful because of its careful construction of plot. All of BSG’s episodes can be seen as following the model of narrative given by Peter Brooks in Reading for the Plot. Brooks, taking a Freudian model informed by narratology, argues that “Narratives both tell of desire—typically present some story of desire—and arouse and make use of desire as dynamic of signification. Desire is in this view like Freud’s notion of Eros, a force including sexual desire, but larger and more polymorphous” (37). Narrative is also dependent on beginnings and endings: “The sense of a beginning, then, must in some important way be determined by the sense of an ending” (94). The role of the end is so important that “All narrative may be in essence obituary in that […] the retrospective knowledge that it seeks, the knowledge that comes after, stands on the far side of the end” (94). Brooks’s narrative form, like that of apocalyptic fiction, begins with the end, and endings imbue meaning on the events that precede them.

To begin at the end, however, means that there must be a return at some point, to an earlier time, to a “primal scene” (Brooks 95). Like the detective story that begins with a murder then attempts to reconstruct prior events from deduction and clues, post-apocalyptic narratives begin with a scene of absolute destruction and attempt to re-cover human history and culture. Brooks, looking through a Freudian lens sees our drive toward narratives that retell primal scenes as a type of repetition compulsion, where “repetition works as a process of binding toward the creation of an energetic constant-state situation which will permit the emergence of mastery and the possibility of postponement” (101, emphasis in original). Each episode of BSG opens with a replay of the moment of apocalypse that must be bound: We are shown Gaius Baltar in his pristine home, ducking behind Number Six as a nuclear blast mows down the landscape outside. The shot is ambiguous—how did Gauis survive the blast? This shot of the nuclear blast followed by an exterior establishing shot of the planet Caprica covered with radioactive clouds. Even though the moment of apocalypse is given in the opening of each episode, but the reasons behind the apocalypse, how the humans of the Twelve Colonies are related to Earth, and the plans of the Cylons are left to be discovered through flashbacks and revelation.

The series also uses a structure of repetition and revelation in a strange, yet effective, montage that occurs at the very end of the opening credits sequence. A percussion-based soundtrack serves as the tension-building background to an otherwise silent montage of clips from the episode that is about to be seen. These images, have little meaning without their context, are not meant to provide clues to the episode, but to invoke the “end as beginning” structure within each episode: in Brooks’s words, “beginnings are the arousal of an intention in reading, stimulation into a tension” (103) which moves the plot forward and creates further desire for narrative. The montage for the final episode of the first season, for example, showed Adama being shot in the chest; viewers watched the show to find out how these events came to be and to contextualize the very brief images that serve as a beginning.

Documenting the End: “Real” time and “real” trauma
It is this discourse of revelation and re-vision (as we literally “see” the episode in montage before it is aired, and we re-see many of the events of the apocalypse each week) that prevents the new BSG from failing like its predecessors. The documentary style allows the program, as a whole, to invoke a sense of real-time and immediate presence. BSG’s attention to the relationship between real time and diegetic time creates an invitation to audience involvement and identification, which we see emerge from the first episode after the miniseries, “33.”
Cinematically, the passage of time is felt by long shots, large jump cuts, and a plot that revolves around time in general. Laura Roslin is dying—she has about six months to live at the beginning of the series, and her progression notes the passage of time. Additionally, many episodes in the first season begin with noting how many days have passed since the Cylon attack. In the third episode, for example, three of our weeks into the season, we are told that only twenty-four days have passed—roughly the same amount of time in our world.

In part, “33” and the episodes of BSG argue for the series’ verisimilitude by its stylistic treatment of suture. Suture, according to Kaja Silverman’s explication of Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” is a “slight-of-hand” which “involves attributing to a character within the fiction qualities which in fact belong to the machinery of enunciation: the ability to generate narrative, the omnipotence and coercive gaze, the castrating authority of the law” (232). By “suturing out” two of the three possible gazes Mulvey identifies—that of the camera and that of the audience—we are asked to identify with the third gaze, that of the (male) character. Fictional television and cinema work to make us forget the mediating technology of the camera and our own subjectivity as audience.

BSG:2003’s distinctive cinematic style, however, might be described as journalistic or documentary. This real-time feel comes from the denial of suture and a minimal use of montage. The camera’s presence is difficult to ignore: Creator Ron Moore states in his blog that he is attempting to create a cinema verité on television by using handheld digital cameras. This “verité” style leads to bobbing, constant motion; the camera is never still, especially during action sequences. In discussing the traditional cinematic techniques that create and maintain the primacy of the male gaze, Laura Mulvey argues the the camera becomes the mechanism for producing an illusion of Renaissance space, flowing movements compatible with the human eye, an ideology of representation that revolves around the perception of the subject; the camera’s look is disavowed in order to create a convincing world in which the spectator’s surrogate can perform with verisimilitude. (26) Battlestar Galactica’s movements are hardly “compatible with the human eye” and the despite the show’s attention to character development and human emotion, the “perception of the subject” is difficult to define in the series. The camera is always present, and it is difficult for the audience to forget their own position as audience.

The effect of the documentary or verité style can be best seen in two scenes in “33.” As the tired and increasingly ragged-looking Adama attempts to give orders to his pilots, the camera moves from side to side, never allowing viewers to see Adama’s still face conducting a gaze. While it is obvious Adama is looking at some screen to get information, we are never given a reverse shot of what he is seeing—only his half-open eyes which the jerking camera movements do not exactly focus on. In a scene where Adama is making life and death decisions, it is natural for an audience to want to know what he is looking at, and to establish a commanding gaze through his character. Both of these are denied, and we cannot identify with his controlling gaze because the camera’s unsettled gaze gets in the way.

While it is “nothing new,” as Ron Moore says, the authors of BSG: 2003 use an explicit split between objective and subjective shots to establish identification and to complicate the plotline. While many of the shots are handheld camera long shots that imply an objective, journalistic gaze, scenes with the psychotic Gaius Baltar rapidly switch between objective shots (which show Baltar talking to a wall or hugging himself) and subjective shots which show us that he is “really” interacting his Cylon lover, Number Six. While this often adds humor to the series, it also tempts the viewers to identify with Baltar as the traditional male gaze.

Montage, the use of cuts which sutures out the camera and allows our look to move around the fictional space, is used limitedly in BSG: 2003; instead, the show is comprised of several long shots strung together. The long shot is broken up by the constant movement of the documentary camera, which pans dizzyingly between characters instead of using a traditional shot/reverse shot technique which sutures out the camera and allows us to see more of the space in the scene. Instead, despite the viewers’ desire for more of the story, BSG: 2003 limits our gaze and our knowledge.

As Sharon (“Boomer”) sits in her cockpit, for example, she faces out toward the hangar. “The Chief” approaches her from behind, and the two stare out the window together. The camera remains on the pair as they talk about the missing commander Helo; despite the panning, bobbing, and weaving of the verité style, there is little movement of the camera around the space of the cockpit or what the Chief and Sharon are staring at. The lack created by the camera is made evident in these long shots, and the longer the camera denies us the reverse shot, the more difficult it is for us to identify with any one gaze. The “reality” of the verité camera work pairs up with the long shot to create the real time documentary or journalistic effect that gives exigency to the topic of the episode.

“33’s” real time sensation is added to by the subject of the episode itself: “33” refers to the number of minutes between each Cylon attack; the episode catalogues the crew’s fatigue, personal struggles with the recent apocalypse, and the relationship between the initial attack and Gaius Baltar’s relationship with Six. The episode begins with an echoing of a clock ticking, and a close-up of Baltar’s sleeping face. We are asked initially to identify with Baltar’s gaze and his experience of time, but as the episode unfolds, the focalization is complicated by continual shifts among the seven “main” characters. The clock continues to tick throughout the episode during moments lacking dialogue. The white face of the gear-work clock is grainy, and is a stark contrast to the crisp shots of beeping digital clocks that act as transitions between scenes. In “33” the clocks hold together the separate storylines, but also give us a point of reference for each significant “space” in the series: the Command Information Center (CIC), Roslin’s ship Colonial One, the hangar, the cockpits, and Commander Adama’s quarters.

Foreshadowing as Temptation: Engaging the Audience
Recovery and discovery of the “story” behind the Cylon apocalypse forward the plot more than any other element, however. Fans often note how offhanded remarks from earlier episodes turn out to be major plot twists in later ones. A specialized viewer-knowledge is created in these moments where memory of past events in the series gives the viewer a sense of being an insider, real member of the Galactica universe. For example, in “33” Apollo draws our attention to it in a lighthearted banter scene about Starbuck being “on drugs” and the squadron being “100% stimulated.” Sharon downplays her lack of exhaustion, but Starbuck interjects a brief “joke” that later turns out to be true: “That’s because she’s a Cylon!” Boomer is, in fact, a Cylon, and this scene is replayed in her mind as she comes to realize that she is not human a few episodes later.
The last episode of the second season of the show is a ninety minute episode that “shocked” viewers and left the series on a seven month cliff hanger. As more of the Cylon’s plan and Baltar’s betrayal became evident, however, the series began to forward the plot of finding Earth; little revelation was left. Many fans refer to this jump as “hitting the Reset button,” but it does not seem likely that the show’s writers simply gave up.

No doubt the audience responded as they did because their genre knowledge was violated. The series had established its own logical progression, but with the “One Year Later” move, seemed to break those conventions. Brooks’s claims of the inherent human need for narrative and the structures which facilitate playing out those desires (such as the detective story) provide a way to understand Battlestar Galactica’s narrative techniques and the final episode’s sudden shift of time. If, as Brooks claims, “[…n]arrative stories depend on meanings delayed, partially filled in, stretched out” (21), a narrative story ends when those meanings have been filled in completely, when the meanings have been “unfolded” (21). Through the first two seasons, BSG: 2003 effectively delays meaning and “stretches” the plot by returning to the apocalypse to “bind” the energy of the chaos. Because readers/viewers constantly desire a recital of the events around a trauma (here, the destruction of the human race), Battlestar Galactica (successfully) tells and retells the events around the apocalypse, discursively moving slowly through diegetical time in order to satisfy readers’ desire for disclosure.

“Lay Down Your Burdens, Part II,” is the second of a two part season finale which revolves around the Presidential election. The episode resolves at least one question of the first two seasons. Laura Roslin reveals to Adama that Gaius is “working with the Cylons” or at least Number Six, a memory she recovered midseason during a near death experience, but had not yet related to anyone else. The betrayal is kept quiet, however; Baltar has somehow been elected President. What is notable about this is not the surprising election result, but that a science fiction television show could present two entire episodes centered on something as pragmatic as an election. The show, however, is not “about” the election; instead, it focuses as usual on the main characters’ emotions as they consider settling on a new planet.

The twist in the plot which shocked fans came at the end of the first hour, where the episode would normally stop. At this point, Baltar lays head down in frustration on his desk: settlement, apparently, is not going well already. The camera starts at one end of the room, then it moves toward Baltar, focusing inward and zooming eventually to the top of his head, actually in his hair. The extradiagetical music becomes percussion-heavy; and the camera remains instead still, for once, in Baltar’s hair. This position on his hair is held for a few seconds, then the screen goes dim. When it lights again, we are “still” focused on his hair, but he is being woken up for the morning, still at his desk. As the camera pulls back, we notice that the office has changed; this is not the next morning at all, but sometime in the future. We are unaware of how far in the future for nearly a full minute, when the digital text appears in the middle of the screen, covering Baltar, letting us know that one year has passed. The delay in positioning the audience in time compounds this uncharacteristic plot move, making it a disorienting moment on several fronts. Because this new time takes place outside of the usual hour-long episode format, the year seems doubly extended. Still, there is another eighteen minutes of show, including five minutes that overlapped into SciFi’s next time slot at 11:30 p.m.

In the summer of 2006, SciFi.com made the final five minutes available to download. While all of the episodes are available to download to iPods for a small fee, the “extra” five minutes and six seconds have been made available free of charge in easily accessible formats, as though these five minutes really were “outside” the normal narrative flow. This supplement to the show is both and ending and a beginning: it ends the former plot line (the Cylons have won the war) while beginning a new cycle of repetition and recovery—we do not really know why the Cylons have tracked down the remaining humans or what has happened in the one year of peace on the new planet. This jump was almost necessary, from a Brooksian point of view. The ends of narrative do eventually happen, despite the delays and twists offered by the “discourse:”

Our most sophisticated literature understands endings to be artificial,
arbitrary, minor rather than major chords, casual and textual rather than cosmic
and definitive. Yet they take place: if there is no spectacular dénouement, no
distribution of awards and punishments, no tie-up, through marriages and deaths,
of all the characters’ lives, there is a textual finis—we have no more pages to
read. (Brooks 314).

The series’ main narrative “ends” when Baltar is elected and the surviving humans settle on their new planet. Wolfe’s formula of post-apocalyptic literature says as much when it names a final ideological battle between good and evil that will decide the value system of the new world (12). Gaius, whose mind is controlled by the Cylons, wins the “battle” of the election and forces the humans to settle; staying in one place for a year is what allows the Cylons to locate the new planet. Once the narrative has ended and there are “no more pages to turn,” we would expect the series to end as well. Fan loyalty and market pressures, however, have forced the show to move on beyond its initial premise, and the final two seasons have moved on to searching for “the thirteenth colony“ (Earth) in earnest, and revealing the Final Five Cylons supposedly hiding in plain sight. To maintain the same structure of revelation and mastery of trauma, a new trauma and new unsaid events must be presented.

Conclusion: Concluding an Apocalypse
What is eye-catching about BSG, what is pleasurable and thus popular, are also what helps the show accomplish what all good apocalyptic/utopian/dystopian narratives do: invoke the reader’s present and present a causal argument. BSG is remarkable for its breaking of conventions, its trust in its audience’s ability to “keep up”(as Moore says in his commentary) and its narrative risks, but these remarkable moves are also sound rhetorical moves. Because the series is still in progress, it is difficult to say exactly what arguments about American society are being forwarded, but it is easy to recognize that something is in the process of being offered. Unfortunately for viewers and fans, the quick leap ahead in time in the show will be followed by eight months of time passing in the real world. The real world was given a chance to catch up with Galactica’s time and to contemplate exactly what is being said in all those gaps and spaces. Now we await the final episode, due out “sometime in 2009,” a promised conclusion to the post-apocalyptic scenario. The lengthy delay in producing this end may be that writers are struggling with how to conclude a post-apocalyptic narrative--thus far, this “final” episode is being filmed as a four-episode miniseries, probably to mirror the series’ beginnings. What we do post-post-apocalypse is a question rarely answered; the Book of Revelation gives us a new heaven and a new earth. It is unlikely BSG will do the same. Stay tuned.


Works Cited
“33.” Battlestar Galactica. SciFi Channel. 14 Jan 2005.
“33 Commentary.” Battlestar Galactica Season One. Writ. Ronald Moore, Christopher Eric James and Michael Taylor. Dir. Stephen McNutt. SciFi Channel. 14 Jan 2005. DVD. Universal Home Entertainment, 2005.
Battlestar Galactica Podcasts. http://www.scifi.com/battlestar/downloads/podcast/. 14 July 2006.
Booker, M. Keith. Alternate Americas: Science Fiction Film and American Culture. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2006.
---. Science Fiction Television. Westport, Conn. : Praeger, 2004.
Brooks, Peter. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Jameson, Fredric. Archaeologies of the Future. London: Verso, 2005.
“Lay Down Your Burdens, Part II.” Battlestar Galactica. SciFi Channel. 10 Mar 2005.
Moore, Ron. “Blog.” http://blog.scifi.com/battlestar/
Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Visual and Other Pleasures. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989. 14-26.
Silverman, Kaja. The Subject of Semiotics. New York: Oxford UP, 1983.
Suvin, Darko. “Narrative Logic, Ideology, and the Range of SF.” Science Fiction Studies. 26:9 (March 1982): 1-25.
Wolfe, Gary K. “The Remaking of Zero.” The End of the World. Eds Eric Rabkin, Martin Greenberg, and Joseph Olander. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983. 1-19.

Thursday, May 01, 2008

Course Encyclopaedia--Even MORE

Badiou, Alain. Being and Event. Trans. Oliver Feltham. London: Continuum, 2007.



The Multiple

"In sum, the multiple is the regime of presentation; the one, in respect to presentation, is an operational result; being is what presents (itself)" (24). The multiple, as a presented element, is also counted. Thus, a mulitple is what gets counted in the count.

"There is another way of putting this: the multiple is the inertia which can be retroactively discerned starting from teh fact that the operation of the count-as-one must effectively operate in order for there to be Oneness" (25). To me, this makes the most sense mathematically. If we consider set theory as mathematicians do, sets are sets of numbers that are grouped according to a common rule (or two or three). These numbers in the set (what B calls "multiples") must fit into the rule to make the set "true"--to fit the definition. If we say "the set of all odd integers", we are giving not only a structure to the set, but anticipating what will be in the set. If we were mathematicians, we'd say that the set of all odd integers is represented by 2n +1--and the formula given allows for an infinity of multiples, and allows us to anticipate what is to come. The count is an effect of this formula, since the formula itself is what first determines what belongs to the "set of all odd integers". Of course, this formula itself can be counted, and the set of all odd integers has other subsets within it (including the elusive "set of all prime numbers"). In math, structure and the count are both easily represented formulaically, and we can predict easily what belongs once that formula can be found (except for the prime numbers one. Damn). Humans are not so easy to order with shorthand.


The One

"The one is not" (23). In "deciding" upon the problem of Western metaphysics ("what presents itself is essentially multiple; what presents itself is essentially one"), Badiou declares that the One--that is, the essence of Being, the unpresented Platonic Ideal, is not. Or, in English, that the unpresented Whole, is not available to us without first there being the parts (multiples) which are presented, which present "being" by there mere presence in our field of vision. Or hearing. Or some other method of witnessing.


"The fact that the one is an operation allows us to say that the domain of the operation is not one" (24). The one is a function of the count in that in counting what is present, we are presented with presentation--which is being itself.


Situation

"I term situation any presented multiplicity.....Every situation admits its own particular operator of the count-as-one. This is the mpost general definition of a structure it is what prescribes, for a presented multiple, teh regime of its count-as-one" (24).

"Yet there is no situation without the effect of the count, and therefore it is correct to state that presentation, as such, in regard to number, is multiple" (25).

Count-as-one (compter-pour-l'un)

See Situation, above. The presented multiples must be counted. The count-as-one also forms the structure of the situation, is a definitional operation. It includes or excludes.
Presentation/Unpresentable/Re-presentation


"Structure is what obliges us to consider....that presentation is a multiple...and what authorizes us, via anticipation to compse the terms of the presentation as units of a multiple" (25). The structure, the formula, is what enables us to see that the set of all integers (the One, being) is Not--that there is only the multiples that occur after the count, after the presentation of examples (multiples, elements) that belong to a given set.

"...for presence is the exact contrary of presentation" (27). Presence is the Being that Plato imagines--being qua being. Presentation, however, is one step removed; it's the expression (interesting word, considering B avoids talking about the symbolic) of that ultimate Being. Presence's definition contains within it the idea that it cannot be presented--the English term uses the past participle for a reason, to show some kind of transformation has taken place, some displacement occurs from the original (Present) to the new form (presentED). Further:

"If there connot be a presentation ofbeing because being occurs in every presentation--and this is why it does not present itself--then there is one solution left for us: that the ontological situation be the presentation of presentation" (27). The situation (the count of, the structure of) being must have presentation within it, but what is it presenting, if not being itself (since being can't be presented?) It is presenting the very idea of presentation--which, again, contains within it the idea of some original Presence somewhere. Or when.


The Void
"...every situation implies the nothing of its all. But the nothing is neither a place nor a term of the situation. For if nothing were a term that could only mean one thing; that it had been counted as one" (54). Every situation contains within it this void because "there is a being of nothing, as a form of the unpresentable" (in order to include, there must also be an exclusion. Every presentable, counted element of a situation also has an unpresented, unpresentable part that is the Being, the one, that is the operational result of the count-as-one) (54).

"The 'nothing' is what names the unperceivable gap, cancelled then renewed between presentation as structure and presentation as structured-presentation, between the one as result and the one as operation" (54). See my above comment.

"By itself, the nothing is no more than the name of unpresentation in presentation" (55). As we discussed in class, the void has only one element--it's name, which names all of the unpresentables as unpresentable.

"I term void of a situation this suture to being. Moreover, I state that every structural presentation unpresents 'its' void, in the mode of this non-one which is merely the subtractive face of the count" (55). The void is a result of a subtraction ( 0 only exists as x - x), the subtraction of the inconsistent multiple from the consistent--or is it the other way around?


"It is essential to remember that no term within a situation designtes the void" (56). It's not surprising, then, that the state is unable to name revolutions as such.

"The void is what bounds the inconceivable, and thereby forecloses itself from any other relation, including its self-identity" (Barker. Alain Badiou: A Critical Introduction. London: Pluto Press, 2002, P. 5).



Event

And names: "The event has the nameless as its name: it is with regard to everything that happens that one can only say what it is by referring to its unknown Soldier" (205). The event, at the edge of the void, cannot be recognized by the state, for fear of the unpresented mass of the void. The name of the event is important, then, for what it can tell us about the multiples involved.

And the state: "The event occurs for the state as the being of an enigma" (208). The state, again, cannot recognize the event for what it is because the situation does not count the unpresented.


The evental site is "an entirely abnormal multiple, that is, a mulitple such that none of its elements are presented in the situation" (175). None of the elements of the site are presented, are not part of the legitimated count--thus, this is the space of possibility.

Course Encyclopaedia--More!

Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Harvard U Press, 1991.


  1. Field

  2. Captial, types of

  3. Habitus

  4. Symbolic Power






Field


Definition "The purpose of Bourdieu's concept of field is to provide the frame for a 'relational analysis,' by which he means an account of the multi-dimensional space of positions and the position taking of agents" (Postone, LiPuma, and Calhoun 5).

As structuralist? "Here Bourdieu reveals the structuralist underpinnings of his theory. He posits that the field is not ontologicaly grounded, but rather constituted of ever-changing relations--it is not a static thing, but a dynamic process, in which fluid relationality is the source of structure. He also refers to a universal aspect of all fields, cultural and otherwise: each involves specific forms of capital, which the agents aim to accumulate and increase through their varying 'strategies'" (Hipsky 192).

Field, then, is somewhat similar to the field (champs) that Foucault describes--it is not simply there, but a construct of relationships. For Bourdieu, these relationships are economical (in that they relate to forms of exchange for strategic purposes).


Political fields: These specific fields are "the site in which, through the competition between the agents involved in it, political products, issues, programmes, analyses, commentaries, concepts and events are created--products between which ordinary citizens, reduced to the status of 'consumers', have to choose, thereby running a risk of misunderstanding that is all the greater the further they are from the field of production. (Bourdieu 172)

Bourdieu widens the political field to not only politicians, but discourse about politics (as long as that discourse comes from an authorized subject).


Capital, types of


Definition of: "Bourdieu's notion of capital, which is neither Marxian nor formal economic, entails the capacity to exercise control over one's own future and that of others" (Postone, LiPuma, and Calhoun 4).

Capital seems related to agency and power (pouvoir); how it differs from either of these is unclear to me.

Symbolic capital: "...functions to mask the economic domination of the dominant class and socially legitimate hierarchy by essentializing and naturalizing social position" (Postone, LiPuma, and Calhoun 5).

Why is symbolic capital special? "Symbolic capital might thus be said to have a dialectical relationship with the other forms of capital; as a concept it underscores the fact that none of the positive properties that circulate on the literary field ever permanently or objectively inhere in any of the individuals, groups, works, or literary forms that are held to partake of those properties" (Hipsky 192).

Symbolic capital is a mystifying (a la Marx) force--it allows us to misrecognize the other forms of capital as natural or necessary.


Habitus


Definition: "Bourdieu characterizes the habitus as a system of general generative schemes that are both durable (inscribed in the social construction of the self) and transposable (from one field to another), function on an unconscious plane, and take place within a structured space of possibilities (defined by the intersection of material conditions and fields of operation (Postone, LiPuma, and Calhoun 4).

What it does: "Between the social structure and agents there is a high degree of correspondence, mediated and generated by the habitus. It is through the dispositions inculcated in the habitus as these unfold in the structural space of possibility that the relationship of individuals to a social structure is objectively coordinated....The possibility of historical change rests in the limited conjucture between a social structure and the actions of agents as mediated by the habitus" (LiPuma 16).

LiPuma posits the possibility of change as a side effect of habitus--habitus mediates between structural determinism and the free will of agents.


Symbolic Power

Symbolic power is created and maintained through structuring structures and structured structures.Symbols are imbued with associations, connotations, and thus power because of the symbolic system they arise from; these powers allow those in dominant positions to hold symbolic capital.

"Structuring Structures": Associated with the "neo-Kantian" tradition: the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, Durkheim, and in many ways Foucault, as "treats the different symbolic universes...as instruments for knowing and constructing the world of objects" (Bourdieu 164).


i.e. We use these structures to construct the mental and physical objects, to create world views.

"Structured Structures": Associated with the semiotics of Levi-Strauss and traditional structuralism. The always/already present structure is what creates meaning from symbols. (Bourdieu 166). Both Structuring and Structured structures only work by social consensus--insofar as subjects submit themselves to the symbolic power that emerges as a result of the system. Dominant classes use this symbolic power in the creation and maintenance of ideologies (a la Marx).

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Course Encyclopaedia, continued

Foucault, Parts 3 and 4 (The Statement and the Archive and Archaeological Description).


Terms for this section








Statement

In French: l'énoncé, the said. Past participle of enoncer. Other uses: "Wording", "Utterance", "lecture", "declaration", "exposition"


What an énoncé is not: "We have put to one side, not in a definitive way, but for a time and out of methodological rigour, the traditional unities of hte book and the oeuvre; that we have ceased to accept as a principle of unity the laws of constructing discourse...or the situation of the speaking subject...; that we no longer related discourse to the primary ground of experience, nor the a priori authority of knowledge" (79).
And/nor: "I do not think that the necessary and sufficient condition of a statement is the presence of a defined propositional structure, or that one can speak of a statement only when there is a proposition" (80).
And: Statements can sort of be seen as a "sentence" bu "the equivalence is far from being a total one; and it is relatively easy to cite statements that do not correspond to the linguistic structure of sentences" (82).
It is also not "an act of formulation--something like the speech act referred to by the English analysts" (82-83).


Relationship to Burke: "...whether, while analyzing 'objects' or 'concepts,' let alone 'strategies', I was in fact still speaking of statements" (79-80).


An attempt at definition: "Must we admit that any series of signs, figures, marks, or traces--whatever their organization of probablity may be--is enough to constitute a statement .....? In which case, we would have to admit there is a statement whenever a number of signs are juxtaposed--or even, perhaps--when there is a single sign. The threshold of the statement is the threshold of the existence of signs" (84). This is still problematic, because MF is trying to talk about statements without talking about the situation or linguistic system (system of differences) or something external to the enunciative moment--and yet, "signs" are only signs in that they are agreed-upon substitutions for the signified. As he says, "If there were no statements, the language (langue) would not exist" (since language systems are rules based on acceptable statements). So clearly he must try again:


The statement is a unique formation, "neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material"; instead, it is "caught up...in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus. It is not so much one element among others, a division that can be located at a certain level of analysis....it is a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they 'make sense', according to what rule they foolow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is carried out by their formulation" (86-87).


Relationship to the referent: "A statement is not confronted...by a correlate--or by the absence of a correlate as a proposition has (or has not) a referent....It is linked rather to a 'referential' that is made up not of 'things', 'facts', 'realities', or 'beings', but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it" (91). In this description, there seems to be something logically prior to the statement that allows it to mean--things are named--this implies someone doing the naming in the past, some consensus on what counts or doesn't count as a "thing" that can be discussed, about which something can be said (énoncé).


And, at last, the clearest definition: "We will call statement that modality of existence proper to that group of signs: a modality that allows it to be something more than a series of traces, something more than a succession of marks on a substance, something more than a mere object made by a human being; a modality that allows it to be in relation wtih a domain of objects, to prescribe a definite position to any possible subject to be situated among other verbal performances, and to be endowed with a repeatable materiality" (107). My emphasis here--the statement positions us--it Situates us. Hence, "situation", the way things are positioned in relation to one another. These positions are hard to imagine, to theorize (to See) without imagining a corresponding space/time, and it is tempting to map these situations onto a geographical map or a timeline. To Place. But while some situations are dependent on physical space or "real time", some are not. My relationship to my father is a situation, a "placement" of subject positions created by our statements to and about each other, but these cannot be mapped onto a map of Ohio or Indiana. Likewise, statements made online cannot be mapped onto the space of the internet, despite our attempts to call them websites or William Gibson's dream of a navagatable matrix that corresponded exactly to ISP locations of servers. As a non-spatial person, I am most bothered by the attempts to describe all of these philosophical and theoretical concepts in terms of space, or diagrams or flow charts: I'm afraid this adds extra elements or makes relationships far more descrete and finite than they really are.

Enough ranting.


Genre [See also Genre in contemporary rhetorical theory]

MF seems to avoid the subject of "genre" as we think of it, probably because naming and thinking of things in terms of genres is itself a unique aspect of our discursive field. Still, there are times when his discussion of "discursive field" seems to border on what we call "genre"--something that is regular, with rules, but formed from the mass of statements. An appropriate response, if you will.

Use of Genre: When discussing the difference between statements and propositional structures, MF finds that two similar sentences, while propositionally the same, are quite different statements: "If one finds the formulation 'No one heard' in the first line of a novel, we know, until a new order merges, that it is an observation made either by the author, or the character (aloud or in the form of an interior monologue); if one finds the second forumulation, 'It is true that no one heard', one can only be in a group of statements constituting an interior monologue, a silent discussion with oneself, or a fragment of dialogue, a group of questions and answers" (81). Here, the placement of the statement in a novel matters: the statement would belong to quite a different discursive formation if it were found, say, in a newspaper, or between friends. Genres, for MF, seem to be here to help us analysts limit the possibilites when we encounter a new statement. We use the idea of "genre" to limit the possible discursive field the statement could belong to, but this does not mean that genre and discursive field are the same thing, for the discursive field of, say, nursing, has many genres involved. Some discursive fields are named for the genres that seem to dominate them (although, I assume, that any genre can participate in the formation of the discourse surrounding an object, subject, or idea). Genres, for Foucault, seem to be more for the analyst--something after the fact that we construct to help us better talk about the rules of formation with some regularity (instead of spinning off into a million clauses as Foucault finds himself doing). In Burkeian terms, we have the recurring situation of needing to discuss the rules that govern statements belonging to a particular discursive formation, and so we create a proverb, a strategy, a Name that can stand as short hand for all of those rules, contexts, authorities, etc that are part of the statement. Archaeology, then, is undoing this naming process, translating this shorthand back into its original grammar and signs.

A discursive formation is not a genre: A discursive formation does "not form a rhetorical or formal unity", but it is "made up of a limited number of statemetns for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not an ideal, timeless form that also possesses a history; the problem is not therefore to ask oneself how and why it was able to emerge and become embodied at this point in time...." (117). Genre study, however, does try to trace the evolution of the genre--which, as Carolyn Miller notes, carries with it the assumption that the genre is now "fixed" ("ideal, timeless form"), that it is a Thing, not a process. Unlike genre, discursive formation does not address a rhetorical or formal unity--while Miller attempts to downplay the requirement of "formal" by moving genre into the realm of social action and speech act theory, there is still a rhetoricality to those things we call genre--a repeatablility, something that can be templated and parodied.

Relationship to Archaeology:

"Archaeology does not describe disciplines. At most, such disciplines may, in their manifest deployment, serve as starting-points for the description of positivities; but they do not fix its limits: they do not impose definitive divisions upon it; at the end of the analysis they do not re-emerge in the same state in which they enteredc it; one cannot establish a bi-univocal relation between established disciplines and discursive formations" (178-9). If by "discipline" he means "statements recognized belonging to the discipline, what I describe above as the dominant forms that help us identify a discourse formation, then clearly he is saying that genre--disciplined texts, texts of a discipline--analysis is different from what he calls archaeology.


Subject [See also Subjectivity from Parts II and III]

Relationship to statement: "A statement also differs from any series of linguistic elements by virtue of the fact that it possesses a particular relation with a subject" (92).

"We must not, in fact, reduce the subject of the statemetn to the first-person grammatical elements that are present within the sentence" (92). And thus, the author dies.


"Is not this subject exterior to the sentence quite simply the individual who spoke or wrote those words? As we know, there can be no signs without someone, or atelast something, to emit them. For a series of signs to exist, there must--in accordance with the system of causality--be an 'author' or a transmitting authority. But this author is not identical with the subject of the statement; and the relation of production that he has with the formulation is not superposable to the relation that unites the enunciateing subject and what he states" (92).

Foucault on Free Indirect Discourse (a literary theory term, style indirect libre): In a novel, we know there is an author whose "name" (George Eliot? Currier Bell?) appears somewhere on the cover. But there are many problems with simply attributing all sentences in the novel to the person who gets paid all the royalties: "(...we are still faced with teh problem of the dialogue, and the sentences purporting to express the thoughts of a character; we are still faced iwth the problem of texts published under a pseudonym: and we know all the difficulties that these duplications raise for practitioners of interperative anlaysis when they wish to relate these formations, en bloc, to the author of the text, what he [sic] wanted to say, to what he[sic] thought, in short, to that great, silent, hidden, uniform discourse on which they build that whole pyramid of different levels); but, even apart from those authorities of formulation that are not identical with the individual/author, the statemetns of the novel do not have the same subject which they provide when they describe things as they would be seen by an anonymous, invisible, neutral individual, who moves magically among the characters of the novel, or when they provide, as if by an immediate, internal decipherment, the verbal version of what is silently experienced by a character" (93). A long quote, yes, but important for those of us concerned with narrative voice in 18th and 19th C novels. The "Free Indirect Discourse" utilized best by Jane Austen is a rhetorical puzzle that many literary scholars try to PoMo their way out of by using the Death of the Author and Foucualt's comments on the author as function. But Foucault here is only pointing out what is bothering the critics in the first place: This other voice that interrupts the normal direct/indirect quote diad is not that of the author, and it is not enough to simply call it part of the author function and throw it away. I want to think through what this not-author, not-narrator voice does to the reader reading. How does it change the truth-value, the "realism" of the novel? How does it try to mold the inner reading voice of the reader to that of this non-author narrator?

The subject, the situation, and the statement: The ennunciative function is not "some additional relation that is superimposed on the others, one cannot say a sentence, one cannot transform it into a statement, unless a collateral space is brought into operation. A statement always has borders peopled by other statements. These borders are not what is usually meant by 'context'--real or verbal--that is, all the situational or linguistic elements taken together that motivate a formulation and determine its meaning" (97). The statement is something other than a sentence said in the right kind of "situation" (as Bitzer imagines there are rhetorical and non-rhetorical ones). What sets a statement apart is that it is unique, although connected to other statements--but these situations are not what "motivates" (as in exigency) a statement to arise. Nor is there any speaking subject bringing it into being, declaring it a statement and thus making it so--"it is not simply the manipulation by a speaking subject of a number of elements and linguistic rules" (99). Nope. Not Bitzer at all.

When analyzing statements we must "operate thereofre with out reference to a cogito." This analysis "does not pose the question of the speaking subject, who reveals or who conceals himself in what he says, who, in speaking, exercises his sovereign freedom, or who, without realizing it, subjects himself to constraints of which he is only dimly aware" (121). In a single sentence, Foucault does away with most of the assumptions that went into Bitzer's rhetorical situation, which required a speaking subject who evaluated the exigencies, tailored a speech to his audience (yes! His!), according to constraints such as genre, time, space, ethos, etc. To analyze the nature of, the thing behind (sub-stance?) a statement, then, we should not analyze it via Bitzer's hermeneutic.


Authority
"...the materiality of the statement is not defined the space occupied...but rather by its status as a thing or object.....we know, for example, that for literary historians the edition of a book published with the agreement of the author does not have the same status as posthumous editions, that the statements in it have a unique value..." (102). This unique value, however, comes not from the authority of the author, but the authority of the institutions of Literary History that bestow that unique value on special editions. The reason why, MF implies, we do value the version of Great Expectations that Dickens wrote first over the one his editor made him write, or the versions edited 100 years later by Dickens scholars (corrected texts, added illustrations, etc), is that the first edition, the edition with Dickens's hand on it, cannot be repeated once Dickens is dead. What is valued is the un-repeatablility.

Authorship: See Subjectivity above.
Constraints [See also Constraints in contemporary rhetorical theory]

Bitzer's constraints seem to imply a silencing--that if conditions were different, so much more would have been said. Bitzer's rhetorical situation can be seen as a filter: it sifts out from the mass of all utterances that which can be said for a given situation, and the mesh of the sieve is made up of situational constraints such as time, place, audience, etc. What emerges is what is left over once all of the unsaid things have fallen through.

Foucault's version of what is said (enonce) is just the opposite. Instead the Said being what is left after all else is silenced, a subtractive process, Foucault's system is one of Positivities. Foucault asserts that "the words, sentences, meanings affirmations, series of propositiosn do not back directly onto a primeval night of silence; but that the sudden appearance of a sentence, the flash of meaning...always emerge in the operational domain of an enunciative function; that between the language as one reads and hears it, and also as one speaks it....there is not a profusion of things half said, sentences left unfinished, thoughts half expressed, an endlessm onolgue of which only a few fragments emerge" (112). Instead, statements are generated by the positivities of a given discursive field (125).


Rupture and change

[See also Badiou's Event above


Relationship to "regularity": "An analysis that reinvests in the empirical element of history...the problematic of the origin: in every oeuvre, in every book, in the smallest text, teh problem is to rediscover the point of rupture, to establish, with the greatest possible precision, the division between the implicit density of the already-said, a perhaps involuntary fidelity to aquired opinon, the law of discursive fatalities, and the vivacity of creation, the leap into irreducible difference" (142). This, Foucault says, is what the history of ideas attempts to do: to find the "tipping point" (as Malcolm Gladwell class it) of an era, idea, movement, discourse. This poses two possiblities: resemblance and procession--either the new idea resembles an old one or it is simply the natural evolution of a series of ideas.
On rarity: the analysis of statements and discourse formations seeks to "establish a law of rarity" (118), to determine what might have been said in a given situation compared to the statements that did appear.
Events and rarity: "...archaology distinguishes several possible levels of events within the very density of discourse....[including]a fourth level, at which the substitution of one discursive formation for another takes place. These events, whic hare by far the most rare, are, for archaeology, the most important" (171). The rarity of a truly new discursive formation is what interests the archaeologists. Here, the event is a linguistic one: the changing out of one form for another in an abrupt and radical way.
Archaeology


In true Foucauldian fashion, we are given more about what archaeology is not than what it is. The chapter "Archaeology and the History of Ideas" contrasts the two methods extensively--but it is simple enough to state that Archaeology seems to do exactly the opposite of the history of ideas, it seems throw out many of "history"'s main thinking tools (like "object" and "subject"), and has a very different understanding of the "progression" of history--Archaeology is concerned with the gaps, not the continuity.


Other, more positive definitions:

"Archaeological description is concerned with those discursive practices to which teh facts of sucession must be referred if one is not to establish them in an unsystematic and naive way, that is in terms of merit" (144).

"Archaeological analysis individualizes and describes discursive formations. That is, it must compare them, oppose them to one another in the simultaneity in which they are presented, disctinguish them from those that do not belong to the same time scale...[etc. A lot}" (157).
"Archaeology tries to establish the system of transformations that constitute 'change'; it tries to develop this empty, abstract notion, with a view to according it the analysable status of transformation" (173).

Sunday, January 27, 2008

COM 632S, or "Everthing you thought you knew about the rhetorical situation, but really you never did"

As you can tell from the long title, my COM class this semester is a bit more rigorous than the others I've taken. And that's a good thing, in some ways, because these are the things I NEED to be thinking about for the...you know. That which will not be named.

[Prelims]

As part of the class, Dr. Sam McCormick (any relation I wonder?), who kicks professorial ass, has asked us to do a "glossary" of terms, a handbook of authors and their relationships to each other, a list of cool quotes, etc. Now, I usually do something like that on here for the first few, crucial weeks of the semester for referencing later in the semester (when I've forgotten everything but my own name...and then some), but Sam is going to be grading these at regular intervals (i.e. TUESDAY of this week), which means I must actually continue my practice beyond week 4.

Damn.

On the plus side, if I put this "glossary" on this blog here, I can use that cute little search button at the top of the page when That Which Will Not Be Named rolls around, and I'm stuck on a rhetoric question.


So, without further ado [complaining], I present to you the first two weeks of Amy's Communication Studies Glossary of Terms Related to the Rhetorical Situation in Contemporary Theory. Enjoy.








Strategy

Burke:
Poetry is a strategic answer (PL 1)
“Another name for strategies might be attitudes” (PLF 297)
Burke defines for us “Strategy” by looking at the Concise Oxford and New English dictionaries, as well as quoting Andre Cheron.


Situation

Burke:
“Situations do overlap [across time], if only because men now have the asmae neural and muscular structure” (2) Physicality matters to situations.
“Proverbs ‘size up’ or attitudinally name” situations (2). Size up—as though we can symbolically encompass and control a situation. But, one must “size things up properly” (298).
Situations can recur, be “typical” (3) and “Social structures give rise to ‘type’ situations, subtle subdivision of the relationships involved in competitive and cooperative acts” (294). These give rise to genres, according to Jamieson and C. Miller.


Bitzer:
“There are circumstances of this or that kind of structure which are recognized as ethical, dangerous or embarrassing” (Rhet Sit, Phil and Rhet, 1968, p. 1) An attempt at defining “situation”
The rhetorical situation consists of audience, context, and exigence.
The presence of rhetorical discourse does not “give existence to the situation; on the contrary, it is the situation which calls the discourse into existence” (rhet sit, p. 2). Definitely “Scenic” like Burke’s Scene-Act ratio.
“It seems clear that rhetoric is situational” (rhet sit p. 3)
“Let us regard rhetorical situation as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations and an exigence which strongly invites utterance; this invited utterance participates naturally in the situation, is in many instances necessary to the completion of situational activity, and by means of its participation with situation obtains its meaning and its rhetorical character” (Rhet sit, p. 5). First: “Natural”—while the word choice bothers me, his implication is clear: the rhetorical situation is not an imagined construct—it is part of the nature(damn that word) of communication. He also wants to emphasize here that the rhetorical situation and its invited utterances are not outside the real world, but that the utterance itself is part of the situation, and can give rise to other situations which require further utterances.
“Rhetorical situations exhibit structures which are simple or complex, and more or less organized” (11). Bitzer goes on to describe what he means by “simple” and “organized”, but the point is clear—by “organized” he means a “settled form with predictable outcomes”
“Finally, rhetorical situations come into existence, then either mature or decay or mature and persist—conceivably some persist indefinitely” (12). What does an “immature” situation look like? How can we tell?

Vatz, Richard.:
“NO situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it” (226). Vatz goes on to say that Bitzer’s version of “situation” requires a “realist” philosophy of meaning, which has “unfortunate implications for rhetoric.” Vatz proposes another “perspective…from which to view the relationship between ‘situations’ and rhetoric.” Vatz links this to the “nature of meaning”—but I’m not sure what he means by that, except that meaning lies not in the object of study itself, but in the person looking at the object. I agree that Bitzer is entirely too Platonic in his understanding of the relationship between situation and meaning, in that case.
Situations are themselves rhetorical and communicative events, as “except for those situations which directly confront our own empirical reality, we learn of facts and events through sone’s communicating them to us. This involves a two part process. First, there is a choice of events to communicate” (228)
Second: “the translation of the chosen information into meaning. This is an act of creativity. It is an interpretive act. It is a rhetorical at of transcendence.” (228).

Genre

Burke:
“Each work of art is the addition of a word to an informal dictionary (or, in the case of purely derivative artists, the addition of a subsidiary meaning to a word already given by some originating artist)” (PLF 300). Burke’s parenthetical note seems to also apply to the idea of genres—often I think Burke ignores the idea of genres where he might find it helpful—here, “Scifi” is also a naming of a situation under which many individual texts fall, and they all share the same situation they are attempting to “size up” In as much as 1984 adds a “1984ism” to the informal dictionary, “dystopian fiction” as a naming does similar work—it de-term-ines both the text to follow and the situation itself.
In sociological criticism of art, “Art forms like ‘tragedy’ or ‘comedy’ or ‘satire’ would be treated as equipments for living, that size up situations in various ways an in keeping with correspondingly various attitudes” (304). Here, it’s not just a particular piece of literature that’s the equipment, but entire forms (genres). How is this different? Here, it is forms that size up situations, that give us attitudes (which makes sense, since genres are all about forming and setting attitudes and expectations in audience members).
Further, “Their [forms’] relation to typical situations would be stressed. Their comparative values would be considered, with the intention of formulating a ‘strategy of strategies,’ the ‘over-all’ strategy obtained by inspection of the lot” (PLF 304). Genres, then, are on another level of analysis, a more encompassing and more abstract (higher order?) of analysis. He even seems to be hinting at what Derrida calls the “Law of Genre” (Loi de genre)—that genre is law, division and separation and categorization, and that genre depends upon some higher order law of law, a logos of lex.

Bitzer:
“The difference between oratory and primitive utterance, however, in not a difference in function; the clear instances of rhetorical discourse and the fishermen’s utterances are similarly functional and similarly situational.” (Rhet sit, p. 5). See Burke on “contemporaneous” situations—PLF p. 301. Also note that Bitzer, like Burke, defines things functionally. The similarity between two utterances—one formal oratory, and one “primitive”—can lead to similar responses, repeated responses, and the creation of a genre.

Structural Determinism


Burke:
“He will not too eagerly ‘read into’ a scene an attitude that is irrelevant to it” (298). Burke seems to imply that situations contain within them a limited number of responses, but that there is still room to act: for earlier, he says, “One tries to change the rules of the game until they fit his own necessities” (298).

Bitzer:

“It is clear that situations are not always accompanied by discourse” (Rhet sit p. 2). But when the discourse is produced, it is necessarily “fitting.”
“The situation dictates the sorts of observations to be made; it dictates the significant physical and verbal responses; and, we must admit, it constrains the words which are uttered in the same sense that it constrains the physical acts of paddling the canoes and throwing the nets” (Rhet sit. p. 5). Note the word choice: Dictates. There is already a linguistic element embedded in the rhetorical situation, long before it ever invites a rhetorical response. If Burke says we respond in order to size a situation up, Bitzer seems to say that situations size themselves up for us.
“Although rhetorical situation invites response, it obviously does not invite just any response. Thus the second characteristic of rhetorical situation is that it invites a fitting response, a response that fits the situation” (10). But, as Vatz points out, if you read the situation from a different perspective, the situation may seem to prescribe many different “fitting” responses to different people. Only when the situation is “strong and clear” is the response obvious, and here “strong and clear” seems to mean “Traditional oratories in traditional genres.”

Miller, Arthur B.:
“Although an exigence essentially specifies limits, the rhetoric has creative latitude to interpret the significance of the exigence within those limits, and it is this latitude of the rhetor that is of primary interest here” (“Rhetorical Exigence” 111). This links back to Burke’s description of rhetorical utterances as “stylized” and “strategic” responses to a situation; Miller is, like me, emphasizing the “stylized” part—even if the situation’s exigency suggests and limits responses to those most fitting, the rhetor is capable of stylizing his/her utterance within certain limits so that not every response is exactly the same. In fact, part of the job of new members of a genre is to both a) fit into the genre, and b) differentiate themselves from other genre members by stylizing their texts in new ways that do not quite break the genre’s limits. Miller is less Scenic than Bitzer and Burke: in this formulation, the situation does determine utterances, but the situation itself must first be perceived by some agent.

Vatz, Richard.
On Bitzer’s claim that the situation of Kennedy’s assassination “controlled” the following rhetorical responses: “This does not mean, however, that the situation ‘controlled’ the response. It means that the communication of the even was of such consensual symbolism that expectations were easily predictable and stable.” (230). Vatz adds a social element with the use of the word “consensual”--I’m reminded of Symbolic Convergence Theory, which states that humans will converge around an event with similar attitudes, form similar responses, which become so formulated and conventional that they become “traditional” and thus expected. Vatz brings in “genre” and “recurring” as explanation for situations which seem to control their responses….which seems to correspond with Bitzer’s above explanation that “strong” and “clear” (to whom?) situations are easier to analyze. After all, it’s only “clear” when we are able to recognize, categorize, and theorize about it---which we can only do when it’s a recurrent event.


"Rhetorical"


Burke:
“Here I shall put down, as briefly as possible, as statement in behalf of what might be catalogued, with a fair degree of accuracy, as a sociological criticism of literature” (PLF 293) In what ways does KB really mean “rhetorical” here? Or have we rhetoricians coopted the materials of sociology in order to justify our practice and study? Is rhetoric now sociological? Is this a bid for legitimacy?

Bitzer:
Poetry is not rhetorical. However, the Declaration of Independence is. Presidential addresses are. Anything “spoken” is.
“Nor do I mean merely that rhetoric occurs in a setting which involves interaction of speaker, audience, subject, and communicative purpose. This is too general, since many types of utterances—philosophical, scientific, poetic, and rhetorical—occur in such settings” (3). Bitzer goes on to suggest other things the specifically “rhetorical” situation is NOT. His difficulty in defining the rhetorical could probably be alleviated if he were to recognize that most discourse, if not all, is rhetorical—it may not be public and formal-address-like, but still rhetorical. I’ll leave my frustrations with people who refuse to see that “aesthetic” is rhetoric at that.
“In short, rhetoric is a mode of altering reality…..by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action” (rhet sit p. 4).
Larson, Richard L. “Lloyd Bitzer’s ‘rhetorical situation’ and the Classification of Discourse” Phil and Rhet 3.3 165-168.
“Such distinctions between rhetorical and non0rhetorical discourse, however, quickly turn out to be slippery or, to state the point more positively the category of ‘rhetorical’ discourse embraces much more of what an ordinary person says and writes than Professor Bitzer’s article might at first suggest” (166) Expanding the rhetorical situation by expanding what counts as rhetorical: YAY! He also rescues poetry and scientific discourses from the abyss of “non”rhetorical discourse

Exigence


Bitzer:
“An exigence is rhetorical when it is capable of positive modification and when positive modification requires discourse or can be assisted by discourse” (Rhet Sit, p. 7) Positive? Hello progress narrative view of history!
Miller, Arthur B. “Rhetorical Exigence.” Philosophy and Rhetoric. (5) 1972 : 111-118. :
“Bitzer’s statements here and elsewhere suggest that an exigence is an identifiable something that acts to specify a speech to be given” (111). “Specify” here seems to indicate a determinism.
Vatz, Richard. :
“Bitzer seems to imply that the ‘positive modification’ needed for an exigence is clear. He seems to reflect what Richard Weaver called a ‘melioristic bias’ “ (227). Vatz argues here that Btizer’s view of exigence is based on a progress narrative—the view that there are “wrong” things that should be “fixed” to better society (perhaps toward a utopian state) and that rhetoric can change the situation for the “better” (ameliorate). Vatz criticizes Bitzer for his belief that the “situation is rhetorical only if something can be done.”—the bias towards agency and “action” in a traditional political/public policy sense is inherent in Bitzer’s definition of what is “rhetorical” in the first place—public speeches, presidential oratories, eulogies, constitutional documents. Is it not rhetorical if there is a negative modification reaction?
Vatz would like to reverse many of Bitzer’s formulations: “For example, I would not say ‘rhetoric is situational,’ but situations are rhetorical; not ‘exigence strongly invites utterance,’ but utterance strongly invites exigence; not ‘the situation controls to rhetorical response,’ but the rhetoric controls the situational response….” (229). I agree with most of these, particularly when utterance invites exigence—we’ve seen this in Bush’s War on Terror recently. It also, as Vatz notes, puts us back in the drivers seat, morally: when we “view rhetoric as a creation of reality or salience rather than a reflector of reality’ we end up assuming much more “responsibility for the salience’ we create.



Audience

Bitzer
“Properly speaking, a rhetorical audience consists of only those persons who are capable of being influenced by discourse and of being mediators of change” (8). How limiting is this, really? Aren’t we all capable of being mediators of change, atl east here in the US? Perhaps there are some slave populations that aren’t capable—but even people with “disabilities’ are able to effect some kind of change, even if it isn’t the desired or intended kind. Bitzer again seems to be imagining only the traditional oratory situation, and that’s far too narrow for what we do today. Later in this paragraph, he details how scientific discourse is also not rhetorical because the scientist can “express or generate knowledge without engaging another mind” (8)—which we know Burke would disagree with as well as many others, and rightly so. What is at stake when we limit our audiences in theories?


Situational con/re-straints

Miller, Arthur B.:
“On the other hand, when a hearer’s constraints combine with his perceptions of actions, phenomena, or facts, the result is the hearer’s perceived exigence: the basis of his expectations as he listens to the speaker” (117). This short quote is doing a lot. First, Miller is emphasizing the subjective nature of exigence: it Is only as much as it is Perceived As. Second, he is adapting the idea of constraints: it is not just the constraints upon the speaker, because as the speaker speaks, the situation inevitably changes; the listener, as perceiver, has his/her own constraints to work within—his own desires to be symbolically expressed and fulfilled. What Miller especially adds is the idea of genre as constraint on both the listener and the speaker: Expectations, formed from experience with recurring and repeated situations and their responses re/constrain what the speaker can say and how the listener can hear it.