Showing posts with label Burke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Burke. Show all posts

Thursday, February 04, 2010

The Rhetoric of Hope

Hope, I posit, is not an emotion, but a critical perspective attained after evaluating current conditions. Hope is thus constructed by our orientation to our experiences and our critical interpretation of sensory input. As a construct, hope is rhetorical, constructed by language, the result of the application of a terministic screen.
This orientation of hope is entelechial, or at least teleological. We hope for something; a desire that is to be fulfilled at some future date. We hope for some end result of the unfolding of history. That desire--a utopian yearning to eliminate hardships and conflict--is grounded in our interpretations of the current state of affairs and what we see as possible or probable outcomes. In this, we can also hope against something, position ourselves opposite of the possibilities inherent in the present.
When we hope, we construct, through imagination and through the logic of cause and effect, the future. When we hope, we provide a vision made manifest through humanity's symbol-using abilities. The future, an absence made present through our use of symbols as abstracted referents, can be evaluated as something to be hoped for or hoped against, and this prescribes a course of action.
The hope of a text, thus, does not have to remain within the world of the text; a text can be hopeful in its projection of future action for or against onto the readers. The most hopeless dystopian novel (in which our hero dies without resolving anything, and the dystopian culture seems to extend infinitely beyond the end of the text) may in fact be hopeful in its relationship to the reader. In positing the future, in making it manifest (enacting the crime, as Burke would say), the text prescribes actions for its readers, actions which will (with hope) prevent the future it describes.
"Action" of course, for Burke, may be first appear as "attitude." In changing attitudes of readers, a text may, in fact, effect change by changing the scene; the instant readers change their orientations and approaches to their own scene, the scene itself has been altered, thus altering the grounds from which the first entelechial extrapolation the text provides. We might even say that the very writing of the text is itself a revolutionary action in that the act of writing changes the author, who is part of his or her own scene.
The rhetoric of hope is always that of change; even those who hope against change recognize the ambiguities of their situation that would enable the transformations they hope against. Hope is syllogistic in its argument: If, then, else. Hope is dialectic in that it positions the present against the future, thesis and antithesis, denying neither their importance, negating neither in favor of the other.
The dystopian motive, the way of seeing that prescribes action, is essentially hopeful. Because it is a motive, Burke would ask us to examine what it means when we say why people are doing it--to look at the language used in dystopic rhetoric and/or the rhetoric of hope. In Chapters 3 and 4 I take two of the most celebrated dystopian narratives as examples of how we talk about dystopia and the implications made when we would imagine disaster; how authors tend to form their narratives, repeated ideas that become tropes, how dystopian writers feature scene over all else, what we can learn about our understanding of endings and ends from the entelechial principle enacted in these texts.

Sunday, November 29, 2009

Chapter 2, or, Amy Re-re-revisits Burke

Chapter 2 of the dissertation is currently titled "Burke's Dystopian Imagination." Last summer, I presented a paper at the Triennial KB conference on a panel with His Most Awesomest Jack Selzer, who, along with Ann George, wrote the Totally Rad Kenneth Burke in the 1930s. After Kate's Really Cool Burke video project presentation, Dr Selzer gave me a few notes on my presentation, the key one being that if I was going to do it right, I'd need a whole book--i.e. 10 pages of conference presentation didn't do justice to the thing (his word) I was noticing about Burke.


When I was "given the opportunity" (their words) to rethink my dissertation, I immediately thought of Selzer's advice. At this point, however, moving to a historical, archival dissertation (NOT MY STRENGTH) would have meant another 18 months at Purdue, without funding, so I changed it up and went with the plan I'm now following. Still, I was left with an entire chapter--upwards of 50 pages--to do something like what I imagined before: a review of Burke's general social philosophy throughout his corpus, hopefully linking the subtle changes, as George and Selzer do, to his changing localities, his "circles" of influence.


The result? I'm stuck on page seven, nowhere near even beginning to quote Counter-Statement. I'm stuck where I was when I wrote the Burke presentation the first time: outlining my assumptions about what counts as dystopian literature, what makes something a dystopian argument. Because I can't show how KB is dystopian until I do that, but I also can't explain what I mean by "dystopian" until I can use Burke's terms.


Ouroboros. The snake eating its own tail. Consummation has never looked so complex.

Wednesday, November 05, 2008

Revising my work: Evelina essay

This essay I am particularly proud of. Written for Emily Allen's course on the British Novel. Some typos, and more close reading needed. Might need to insert some Blair.


A Good Woman Learning to Speak Well: Speech and Argumentation in Evelina

Not long after her first excursions into London social circles, the title character of Evelina writes to her guardian Mr. Villars: “But, really, I think there ought to be a book, of the laws and customs à-la-mode, presented to all young people, upon their first introduction into pubic company” (Burney 83). As arguments, novels represent female characters with given traits in a positive or negative light, thus promoting or discouraging certain behaviors in readers—Evelina’s book exists, and she is one of many who are presenting to young readers the customs of polite society. In contextualizing the novels’ rise as both a cause and effect of the rise of a middle class, critics such as Michael McKeon, Nancy Armstrong, and J. Paul Hunter argue that novels act as what Kenneth Burke calls "strategic answers, stylized answers" (The Philosophy of Literary Form 1). Novels offer both reader and writer a symbolic means to react in an uncertain situation. The female heroine of Evelina and other eighteenth-century novels negotiate for the reader this uncertain environment and eventually arrive at a satisfactory conclusion.
If we take these as our premises, then we must next ask what behavior is being promoted through the female heroines. McKeon, Hunter, and Armstrong have argued that the target behavior is either an appropriate sexuality or domestication by pointing to the characterization and plot development in these novels. The domesticated or tamed female has been described as modest or decorous in her actions, but apart from elocution, little has been written about women’s speech, particularly argumentative speech.
Patricia Howell Michaelson’s Speaking Volumes: Women, Reading, and Speech in the Age of Austen takes up the issue of women’s speech as represented in Austen’s novels, and the resulting social action that representation incurred. Michaelson is concerned with sociolinguists’ interpretation of “gendered language” as a question of “bad,” submissive silence as opposed to a strategic ethos of silence (4-6). Silence, for Michaelson, is not necessarily a sign of submission—it may be a rhetorical choice. If rhetoric has been, since Quintilian, defined partly as “a good man speaking well,” how are we to understand the utterances, or lack thereof of good women? While Michaelson studies the dialogue and conversational aspects of Austen’s novels, however, I am interested in the ways the novels describe and thus prescribe (or argue for) an appropriate female rhetor through these conversations..
Written by Frances Burney in 1778, Evelina seems to be particularly concerned with speech, more so than earlier novels. Evelina, with its central female narrator learning how to navigate various discourse conventions, prescribes for its female audience a way of arguing that embodies politeness, wit, and, above all, ethos over pathos. The history of rhetoric has been a history of conflict over the relative importance of these elements. In the eighteenth century, Wilbur Howell argues, the influence of Ramus placed concerns of ethos and elocution over logic, which was completely removed from rhetoric. When Mrs. Selwyn says “But for this observation […] I protest I should have supposed that a peer of the realm and an able logician were synonymous terms” (361) she is referring not to a connection to philosophical logics, but to Aristotelian “logic,” which we now call rhetoric. Those who spoke of “rhetoric” were most often working with Cicero’s reading of the Greek rhetoricians (Howell 75). While “rhetoric” as we now use it would not have been involved with epistemological questions or dialectical constructions, Howell claims that these ideas were debated in the 18th century, just as a separate category. Cicero’s popularity might have saved rhetoric from descending completely into elocution; the 18th Ciceronians, according to Howell, interpreted Cicero’s rhetoric as
the chief art of discourse, [which] consisted of all the principles and precepts which regulated all speaking and all writing addressed to popular audiences on occasions when some doctrine had to be taught, some thesis proved, some great achievement or great man celebrated for public enlightenment, or some course of action proposed as the best response to the facts of the case and to the human interests and feelings concerned. (77)
This last concern of eighteenth century rhetoric is what we find to be the preoccupation of Evelina: How, the novel asks, should women respond to “the facts” of a case of conflicts of interest? To revise Quintillian, how do we know when a good woman is speaking well?
Evelina provides possible strategic and stylized answers to this question in two ways. First, there is the epistolary nature of the novel; Evelina is writing to her father, being careful to omit some details, and to “delicately” phrase others. In first asking Mr. Villars for permission to go to London, Evelina hedges her arguments with deferrals to Mr. Villars’s authority: “They are to make a very short stay in town. The captain will meet them in a day or two. Mrs. Mirvan and her sweet daughter both go;--what a happy party! Yet I am not very eager to accompany them: at least, I shall be very well contented to remain where I am, if you desire I should” (25). In her appeal, Evelina first convinces Mr. Villars of her safety (the captain will appear shortly, and the Mirvan women go often anyway) before submitting, however grudgingly.
Evelina censors for her father several scenes, first by not quoting herself directly, and secondly by simply omitting events. Upon discovering the stranger in their coach is none other than Madame Duval, her grandmother, Evelina writes “But I will not shock you with the manner of her acknowledging me, or the bitterness, the grossness—I cannot otherwise express myself—with which she spoke of those unhappy past transactions you have so pathetically related to me” (54). Evelina’s reluctance to repeat Madame Duval’s “gross” speech shows that she has already a strong education in what is appropriate speech for women.
Michaelson categorizes this type of polite, censorious speech as one of three techniques Austen teaches us: “[Pride and Prejudice] begins […] with an example of what not to do in conversation, with Mr. Bennet’s refusal to participate in the turn-taking cooperatives we expect” (203). Madame Duval may take part in the turn-taking, but other discourse conventions of late eighteenth century England elude her, and Evelina is careful to show Mr. Villars that she knows that her grandmother’s speech is not acceptable. Michaelson sees similar comments in Pride and Prejudice on what not to say: “Earlier, formal modes of conversation are ridiculed in the obsequious flattery of Mr. Collins, who not only constantly spouts fawning phrases, but actually plans them out ahead of time” (204). In Austen, the “polite converser actively smoothes interactions and feelings”—and does not speak with “impertinence” (204-205); her novels prescribe this action. Evelina’s letters, in their censoring, show readers what not to say.
Evelina’s original insistence on omitting or glossing over for Mr. Villars the inappropriate speeches does not mean that Evelina is necessarily arguing for complete silence on the part of a female rhetor; instead, we must see Evelina’s letters in terms of the structure of the novel itself. Each of the three volumes provides Evelina opportunities to practice and perfect her writing and speech, and each repetition of events shows her improving her responses. This type of structure is itself an argument; Burke calls it a “repetitive form”: “Repetitive form is the consistent maintaining of a principle under new guises. It is restatement of the same thing in different ways” (125). Evelina restates common social interactions—dances, theater, walking in gardens, courtship—in each of its three volumes, with slight shifts in characters and context.
While Evelina’s rhetorical moves in her letters show us an increasing sophistication of discourse analysis and response, the speech she represents in those letters is perhaps more important in that this representation is more obvious in its prescription. The three-volume structure of Evelina provides, as stated above, a qualitative progression for readers to measure and analyze Evelina’s education (and thus her speech). Readers know that the early arguments Evelina makes are less appropriate or mature than those appearing later. The “young” Evelina is not to be emulated, but is to be used as a starting point for further development.
In the novel, “argument” is difficult to separate from daily speech; we could argue that all speech is an argument of sorts, even if it is just an argument for the character of the speaker. In Evelina, much of the speech represented directly is connected to conflict, as these comprise the interesting parts of Evelina’s life. “Arguments” are all around Evelina, whether in the form of serious conflict, or mere negotiation of opinions of where to spend the evening. The early arguments Evelina finds herself in are largely out of her control; she does not yet have the skills to navigate the discourse community of “the world” outside Mr. Villars’ home. For most of her arguments, then, Evelina is silenced; at her first dance, she finds herself unable to even speak to Lord Orville: “He begged to know if I was not well? You may easily imagine how much I was confused. I made no answer, but hung my head, like a fool, and looked on my fan” (32). Later, she is embarrassed by her silence: “It now struck me, that he was resolved to try whether or not I was capable of speaking on any subject. This put so great a constraint upon my thoughts, that I was unable to go further than a monosyllable, and no even so far, when I could possibly avoid it” (34). Her lack of knowledge about “the world” prevents her from making an appropriate response.
Current-traditional rhetoric and most sociolinguistic theories find silence to be the most submissive position to be in an argument. Vocalization, as Michaelson recounts, has traditionally been given precedence over even strategic silence, and “Moreover, this dominant metaphor has encouraged us to pity, ignore, or discount the many generations of women for whom silence represented a potentially useful strategy” (3). Silence is the position of the marginalized, and Evelina is continually silencing herself-- in the first half of the novel her silence is the submissive, powerless silence we usually associate with that metaphor, but in the second half we see a strategic silence emerge. The presence of silence is not surprising; in tracing the history of desire in the novel, Nancy Armstrong argues that “one cannot distinguish the production of the new female ideal either from the rise of the novel or fro the rise of the new middle classes in England” (8) and that ideal featured a woman who spoke to few, and certainly did not participate in public, policy forming arguments (Armstrong 18-20). In recent years, rhetoricians have focused less on conditions of silencing, however, and more on tactics for overcoming marginalization, even through silence. Still, it is important to remember that Evelina is not representing and prescribing the characteristics of all women’s speech. Evelina is herself a middle-class white woman whose story is an educational tool for other middle-class white women in England—what Kenneth Burke calls a “symbol” (Counter-Statement 152) which gives a “pattern of existence” (157), a template of behavior for readers to follow.
One such “representative anecdote” for speech and silence can be found in Evelina’s first conflict with Sir Clement Willoughby. Sir Clement is unrelenting in his pursuit of Evelina, who lies to him by saying she already has a dance partner. Evelina attempts to escape Sir Clement’s, but he continues his advances:
“You do me justice,” (cried he, interrupting me) “yes, I do indeed improve upon acquaintance; you will hereafter be quite charmed with me.”
“Hereafter, Sir, I hope I shall never--“
“O hush!—hush!—have you forgot the situation in which I found you?” (47).
Sir Clement interrupts Evelina even as she attempts to politely refuse. To escape the “raillery,” Evelina pretends that Lord Orville is her partner. Upon reaching the safety of Mrs. Mirvan, Evelina quits speaking all together: “I had not strength to make my mortifying explanation;--my spirits quite failed me, and I burst into tears” (49).This silencing, Sara Mills points out, has been the topic of most sociolinguistic studies of gender, it has become a trope of the gendered speech discussion to the point where analysis has been stalled at the male-voiced/female-silenced binary. Like Michaelson, Mills finds fault with the earlier sociolinguistic analysis that posited a normatively polite (evasive) and inoffensive female speech, “characterized as deviant in relation to a male norm which, by implication, was characterized as being direct, confident and straight-talking” (Mills 5). For Mills, this characterization is not necessarily the best binary to follow, since “many of these features, particularly those associated with women's over-politeness and deference, are in fact characteristic of feminine rather than female speech, that is, a stereotype of what women's speech is supposed to be” (5 emphasis added). It is precisely this prescription of behavior that Evelina invokes; however, the majority of Evelina’s polite silences appear early in the narrative, when Evelina’s “discourse competence” (Mills 4) is still unformed.
Silence is, above all, a phenomenon of power structures. Julia Allen and Lester Faigley analyze the various ways that those in the margins try to overcome that silence or work within it. For them, the written discourse of novels, poems, and even music can teach methods of subversion (143). Working with Burke’s idea of “perspective by incongruity,” Allen and Faigley argue that replacing direct argument with the metaphorical or euphemistic to be one way the marginalized can speak: “To say the unsayable, writers have often substituted one safer representation for another more definitive one” (164). Narrative, Allen and Faigley suggest, is one way to say the unsayable, to provide a different kind of “rationality” (167). Evelina is not completely silenced; she replaces her silence with talking about her silence in letters—letters which are compiled by “the editor” (Burney) and transmitted to readers.
Despite this early, silenced speech, the majority of Evelina represents Evelina’s own arguments as the correct approach for a middle-class woman. The second volume contrasts the way Evelina handles confrontational speech with that of her less-savvy cousins and grandmother. Her conflicts with Clement and her cousins provide ample opportunity for her to create and give arguments. Without the protection of Mrs. Mirvan, Evelina must speak for herself, and when she does, she begins to discover which techniques are more effective.
Such rhetorical examination was running strong in the eighteenth century; while the “current-traditional” theorists (Hugh Blair, George Campbell, and Richard Whately) formulated rhetoric as a scientific set of rules to follow, still others focused their attentions on elocution. Women rhetors, however, had the most to gain or lose from the stabilization of rhetorical theory and practice, and several novelists, Jane Donawerth argues, used their novels and other fiction as a place to revise, parody, or reject outright the tradition that Howell describes. Donawerth points to Maria Edgeworth’s “Essay on the Noble Science of Self-Justification,” in which “Edgeworth mockingly parodies and transforms the techniques of traditional rhetoric and thus resists not only the repression of women’s voices and powers in marriage, but also the dangerous potential for manipulation in rhetoric” (245). Edgeworth, like many composition theorists today, knows that the restraints and formulas of current-traditional rhetoric are dangerous not because they are ineffective, but because they are too effective; they allow no room for other voices, they posit a singular, empowered ethos, and they categorize their audiences absolutely (leaving women always as passive, ready to be told the “truth” by male orators). Edgeworth challenges that rhetoric, however, through satire: “In her treatment of wives’ defenses of themselves from husbands’ blame, she parodies the categories of voice taught in elocution, for her shrew has mastered the ‘petulant, the peevish, and the sullen tones’” (Donawerth 245). Even theories of elocution, which was rarely concerned with the content or evidence of an utterance, gendered the speaker, prescribing a particular pitch and thus a particular version of the feminine. Women rhetoricians were in constant dialogue with the newly established theories and while neither Evelina nor Burney does not exactly theorize argumentation, the text does, by giving a representation of appropriate female speech and its consequences, promote a certain version of rhetorical practice. In the second and third volumes, as Evelina perfects her argumentation skills, we learn with her what good argumentation looks like.
In Volumes II and III we are shown various forms of argument and speech Politeness and “decorum” are shown as important to good speech when Evelina comments on the Branghtons’ language. Unlike Evelina, her cousins have no faculty of “sentiment,” the ability to engage in “moral reflection [and] a rational opinion” (Todd 7). Sentimental women (and, to a lesser extent, men) were to have compassion and pity for all, which was then reflected in their speech (19). Sensibility is the outward expression of being affected by pathos, and thus becomes a property of ethos: If one is not swayed to sympathy, one’s character comes into question (Michaelson 186). Evelina is convinced of her cousins’ faults because of the way they speak. Mrs. Duval has none of the decorum that Evelina comes to have by the end of the novel. Evelina comments on the coarseness of her introduction: “The manner in which Madame Duval was pleased to introduce me to this family, extremely shocked me. ‘Here, my dears,’ said she, ‘here’s a relation you little thought of; but you must know my poor daughter Caroline had a child after she run away from me[….]” (70). Madame Duval speaks frankly about Evelina’s private legitimacy problem within seconds of the introduction, causing Evelina to be “shocked.”
The Branghton sisters are no better: Evelina’s letter portrays their conversation as idle “ceremony” (71). Their brother even comments on their gossip and chatter. When asked what the women will find to say to one another, he replies indignantly: “‘Say!’ cried young Branghton, ‘O, never you think of that, they’ll find enough to say, I’ll be sworn. You know the women are never tired of talking’” (188). In addition to being empty talkers, the Branghton sisters are, in Evelina’s opinion “abrupt” and in “want of affection, and good-nature” (172). Additionally, Evelina finds that their conversation “manifested equally their folly and their want of decency” (172). The lack of sentiment and sensibility displayed by Evelina’s relatives gives Evelina the opportunity to comment on such indecency, and to point out to the readers the differences between her own mistakes, which are “never willfully blameful” and which she is always embarrassed by, and the sisters’ brash conversation which they do not notice is uncouth.
Sensibility is also important to understanding theories of rhetoric in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; what we now call identification and pathos became the central terms when describing how to “move” an audience. Evelina’s own sensibility endears her to Orville, even when he is suspicious of her meetings with Mr. Macartney: “‘My dearest Miss Anville,’ he said, taking my hand, ‘I see, and I adore the purity of your mind, superior as it is to all little arts, and all apprehensions of suspicion’” (364). Evelina’s purity from the “arts” of speech and rhetoric is a better argument than any she could—and tries to—give him to explain Mr. Macartney’s presence.
Evelina’s pathetic moments with Madam Duval show sensibility, but this is not used when arguing. Instead, sensibility and sentiment appear as part of non-argumentative speech. When Sir Clement and the Captain “rob” Madame Duval, Evelina pleads with Sir Clement to have pity: “—pray leave me, pray go to the relief of Madame Duval,--I cannot bear that she should be treated with such indignity” (147). Despite her pity and appeal, Evelina is still silenced quickly by Sir Clement’s relentless appeals of his own, and he interrupts her argument to stop his “schemes” to hurt Madame Duval, and instead Clement asks her to “be less averse to trusting” him (148). Evelina is not yet able to turn the conversation in her favor or to cause change.
Evelina’s character as expressed in her arguments begins to provide the basis of her speech. Because of the commonly held beliefs about the “nature” of women, a good woman speaker, to be heard at all, must adhere to the rules of sensibility. Her sensible character is as much a part of her argument as the syllogisms she can provide for evidence. Michaelson finds this to be especially true in Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, in which Elizabeth “privileges ethos as a means of persuasion, while Darcy insists on logos” (Michaelson 184). In her letter to Lord Orville explaining that she had nothing to do with the Branghton sisters untactfully asking for his carriage, Evelina begins by announcing her shame and “shock.” By arguing that “I cannot forbear writing a few lines, to clear myself from the imputation of an impertinence which I blush to be suspected of” (250), Evelina constructs for herself the appropriate ethos for the situation. Her shame points to her understanding of what is appropriate, and the blush she describes is a sign of her true modesty. Her language is formal, as she knows that it is improper for a woman to begin correspondence with a man so suddenly, and the letter is short. She signs the letter as “Your Lordship’s most humble servant” (250); not as a friend or acquaintance. Her signature places distance in their relationship, the very subject of contention that is the exigency for her letter. Even her signature must be constructed with attention to ethos.
Evelina’s chooses her words carefully in this section because of how much is at stake for her. Norman Page provides a framework for understanding the role of character in speech in the novel. Although Page, like many others, focuses on representations of dialect in the novel, he does make a claim for a connection between the representation of dialogue in general and the presentation of character. Because we cannot see the character as we would on stage, Page argues, we must gather character information from the way the character speaks. In some novels, a dialect tells us about the character’s class; for others, word choice and conversational techniques provide characterization (Page 110). A character’s character is in part determined by his or her rhetorical understanding.
In Volume III we are given yet another counter example to Evelina’s newly acquired rhetorical sense. Mrs. Selwyn is perhaps the best female rhetor in the novel, but the novel’s attitude toward her “artistic” talents implies that she is perhaps too good at arguing. Sir Clement, the subject of many of Mrs. Selwyn’s comments, argues that she “afforded some relief from […] formality, but the unbounded license of her tongue—“ but is cut off by Evelina’s defense of her temporary guardian (343). Mrs. Selwyn is never polite, but is witty in her short, sarcastic comments and rational in her longer arguments to Mr. Belmont. To convince Mr. Belmont that Evelina is his daughter, she first meets with him briefly alone. When her arguments are ineffective, Mrs. Selwyn, knowing her audience, brings Evelina with her. She reasons that if Mr. Belmont is firm in his conviction, then he at least should “have no objection to seeing this young lady?” (372). Unable to find a reason why he should fear a young woman, Mr. Belmont assents, and Mrs. Selwyn wins the argument.
While the silent, uneducated response is not advocated by the novel, neither is the “force” (369) of Mrs. Selwyn. Evelina’s own comments lead us to believe that we are not to follow in Mrs. Selwyn’s footsteps: although she defends against Sir Clement’s criticism, in her asides to her father, her opinion is quite clear: “And now, my dear Sir, I have a conversation to write, the most interesting to me, that I ever heard. The comments and questions with which Mrs. Selwyn interrupted her account, I shall not mention; for they are such as you may very easily suppose” (345). Evelina’s father knows Mrs. Selwyn well enough to imagine what the woman might have said, but more importantly, Evelina does not find the comments worthy of copying down. To Evelina, the humorous and critical remarks do not count as necessary to the story, nor do they make for even an interesting aside in a letter.
As a contrast to Mrs. Selwyn, we are shown Evelina’s most effective argument—one in which she does not have to say a word. It is argument by face and demeanor. When Evelina meets her birthfather for the first time, Mr. Belmont is not convinced by the logical arguments and wits of Mrs. Selwyn. Evelina in arguing for her legitimacy is most effective when silent; Mr. Belmont exclaims “Yes, yes” and acknowledges Evelina is the true daughter of Caroline Evelyn. Throughout his shocked speech, Evelina remains “Speechless, motionless,” and yet has managed to “set [his] brain on fire” (372). Her best argument is simply her presence.
Evelina’s ethos comes from her heritage. There is nothing she can do to either improve or ruin it; her face, not her reasoning enables her to live a middle-class fairytale. Still, argumentation in this novel is not left entirely to the parentage of the rhetor. There are definite “bad” rhetorics, in the form of the Branghtons and the bad ethos of Mrs. Selwyn. From this, we can extrapolate what the novel recommends. At the very least, speakers should not be silenced when silence is an ineffective response to inappropriate proposals (like that of Sir Clement). Speakers should also speak politely, but provide enough information so that mistakes are not later made. Finally, speakers should provide an ethos appropriate to the situation; Evelina’s character as her mother’s daughter is the only appeal that will sway Mr. Belmont, and Mrs. Selwyn’s character as harsh and railing prevents her from being seen as the witty, intelligent speaker she is. Evelina does not provide a complete picture of a good female rhetor, but it does provide anecdotal tips to those about to be introduced into “pubic company.”
Works Cited
Allen, Julia and Lester Faigley. "Discursive Strategies for Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument." Rhetoric Review. 14 (1995):142-172.
Armstrong, Nancy. Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1987.
Burke, Kenneth. Counter-Statement. 3nd Ed. Berkley: University of California Press, 1968.
Burke, Kenneth. The Philosophy of Literary Form. Berkley: University of California Press, 1974.
Burney, Francis. Evelina. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Howell, Wilbur Samuel. Eighteenth Century British Logic and Rhetoric. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971.
Michaelson, Patricia Howell. Speaking Volumes: Women, Reading, and Speech in the Age of Austen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002.
Mills, Sara. “Discourse Competence: Or How to Theorize Strong Women Speakers.” Hypatia 7 (Spring 1992): 4-17.
Page, Norman. Speech in the English Novel. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988.
Todd, Janet. Sensibility: An Introduction. London: Methuen, 1986.

Sunday, June 29, 2008

Toward Helhaven: Burke's Dystopian Imagination

AmyLea Clemons. "Toward Helhaven: Burke's Dystopian Imagination." Presented at the Seventh Triennial Conference of the Kenneth Burke Society. Villanova University, Radnor, PA. June 29-July 2, 2008.

"On the other hand, though I have, for several months, been compulsively clipping news stories about pollution, in the long run any kind of complaining becomes a damned bore" (Burke, Hellhaven 56).

"Toward Helhaven (misspelled in your program--but that's my fault): Three Stages of a Vision" appeared in the early 1970s, declaring that "Some give a decent life on Earth ten years, some thirty, some at most a hundred" (62). Here we are in 2008, though--and while watching CNN might convince us that we are now living in Burke's technological and ecological wasteland, we have not yet had to leave the planet. Dystopian or anti-utopian fictions such as Orwell's 1984, Huxley's Brave New World, LeGuin's The Dispossessed, and Atwood's Oryx and Crake begin with a satirical critique of the author's current conditions and extrapolate the situation into the future, weaving together narrative, satire, and argument to create powerful texts that, in the end, are not about some future hero or heroine, but about the reader in his or her present. In the 1930s and 40s the genre emerged and flourished; Hitler's march across Europe, the US's flailing then recovering economy, new forays into technology, and the horrors of the eventual world wide war led many writers to put pen to paper and imagine the worst case scenario. But Burke's comment that I began this presentation with holds true: in the long run, these warnings fall flat, they become too generic, predictable, and no longer rhetorically effective. A damned bore, which brings us no closer to preventing apocalypse than before.

In the same essay that Burke declares these complaints "boring," he offers his own dystopian vision of ecological collapse, overwhelming technology, and constant surveillance. This hellhaven satire, however, could be seen as yet another complaint--ineffectual, unenlightening, and even trite--if we do not consider Burke's understanding of rhetoric and social change. The rest of this presentation will highlight Burke's dystopian imaginings as they are threaded through CounterStatement and Permanence and Change, and point to how these works emphasize Burke's inherent hope in human Acts and Agency.

First, let me outline some of my assumptions about dystopian fiction. Dystopian fiction is persuasive in a very particular way: It attempts to move the reader to action by presenting an extrapolation of the current situation (Eric Rabkin Nowhere Else). Dystopian fiction--particularly that of the 1930s to 1950s--has a regular form and plot structure; while the particularities of these structures are up for debate, few deny that dystopian fictions are highly "generic" and easy to recognize for their formal elements, tropes, and appeals (Darko Suvin and Gary Wolfe have both posited logical structures for the genre). More particularly, I argue, dystopian fiction's structure has an awareness of its readers and the tendencies of reading humans to identify with, engage with, and emotionally invest in certain plot structures and hero archetypes. As such, dystopian fictions (both in literature and film) feature heavily on space and context (for readers to recognize similarities) and attempt to provide a hero that all can identify with. What is important for me is that even as I describe here these structures and assumptions, I find myself struggling to avoid Burkeian terminology because there are few who are able to describe the workings of dystopian fiction as Burke does. It is not just that Burke provides us with terms for analysis, however; but that the connection between Burke and dystopianist thought goes both ways: That is, I do not want to "use" Burke to analyze dystopian fiction, but to show how what M. Keith Booker calls a "dystopian impulse"--the impulse to warn and to extrapolate to a worse case scenario is already a part of Burke's system.

As early as CounterStatement, Burke shows a particular attention to what Wayne Booth calls "didactic" fiction--his opening statements on "pamphleteering" and its relationship to "pure" art and "proletariat" literature can easily be applied to utopian and the emerging genre of dystopian fiction. In discussing censorship (always a "dystopian" issue), Burke compares Plato's Republic to Aristotle's Poetics, declaring that the censorship in The Republic requires a "one-to-one ratio between art and society" (xii)--a direct correlation between what is imagined and what comes to be. Burke, unsurprisingly, links this Platonic fear of mimesis to the totalitarianism of the 20th century. Burke continues down this dystopian path as he describes how "liberal" art, acting as a lightening rod (as Aristotle suggests in the Poetics) can quell the fears of the day, becoming a release valve. The fear he describes is recognizably dystopian: "The sort of fear I had in mind, for example, concerned the attitude toward the ‘promises’ of applied science. More and more people, in recent years, are coming to realize that technology can be as ominous as it is promising. Such fear, if properly rationalized, is but the kind of discretion a society should have with regard to all new powers" (xiii). Burke’s dystopianism appears here, as he first applauds those rational enough to fear, then warns us to pay attention to the fears, all the while assuming reason will prevail against both mass panic and blind scientific pursuit. Once aware of the faults, the logical human will respond rationally and evade danger.

Later, Burke more clearly aligns himself with the arguments of dystopian fiction when he argues through Gide that "society might well be benefited from a disintegrating art, which converts each simplicity into a complexity, which ruins the possibility of ready hierarchies, which concerns itself with the problematical, the experimental, and thus by implication, works corrosively upon those expansionistic certainties preparing the way for our social cataclysms. An art may be of value purely through preventing a society from becoming too assertively, too hopelessly, itself (105). Many dystopian fictions draw their dystopian "energies" (again, Booker's word) from the extent to which they become too much of something--too capitalist, too egalitarian, too controlled, too masculine, too religious...etc. More importantly, Burke's Lexicon Rhetoricae gives us a hermeneutic for analyzing the rhetoric of literature. Even here, we see Burke's concern for identification and reader participation--both of which are essential to the mechanics of dystopian literature. In describing the Symbol and the emotions or associations it may arouse in a reader, Burke notes that "Often, to 'charge' his work Symbolically, a writer strains to imagine some excessive horror, not because he is especially addicted to such imaginings, but because the prevalence of similar but less extreme symbols has impaired their effectiveness" (164) His following discussion of the proletariat novel utilizes the terms of the Lexicon to show the relationship between "aesthetic" devices and rhetorical ones, connecting again reading, action, and social change.

Permanence and Change

, of course, is concerned with humans as social beings, but what Burke again emphasizes, particularly in Part I, is the relationship between interpretation and action. It is not simply that societies change or, in a more Marxist screen, that conflicting classes eventually lead to a synthesis of two opposing groups. For Burke, there must be a critical moment when the situation is interpreted--when, to continue Burke's opening metaphor, the trout recognizes the bait as bait and swims the other direction. Unlike the simple yet noble trout, however, "We not only interpret the character of events (manifesting in our responses all the gradations of fear, apprehension, misgiving, expectation, assurance for which there are rough behavioristic counterparts in animals)--we may also interpret our interpretations" (6). A dystopian trout would write about the horrors of bait, and other trout would respond in kind--the more horrific that bait-story, the more likely other trout are to avoid shiny lures. Burke continues to expect the (albeit flawed) human mind to first recognize, then interpret, criticize, and finally Act. While there may be some jumping around between the interpretative and critical stages, the form remains basically stable, with "any educated action" being one that has been "abstracted" (pc 105)--that is, put into a schema of interpretation. What is worrisome to Burke is that trained incapacity will prevent us from completing these steps, and, by implication, prevent us from amelioration.

Further in Permanence and Change, Burke refers to the "technological psychosis" which we see echoed in the tradition of technological dystopias such as 1984, Vonnegut's Player Piano, the Terminator series, and Burke's own Helhaven. Like most of the technological dystopias, Burke's fears seem centered on the man/machine divide, and he asserts that "man is essentially human, however earnestly he may attempt to reshape his psychological patterns in obedience to the patterns of his machines" (PC 63). Later he asks "How many people today are rotting in either useless toil or in dismal worklessness because of certain technological successes?" (101).

In general, dystopian arguments may be seen as a particular case of what Burke refers to as a danger-response (150)--an interpretation of a stimulus (in this case, a situation) as dangerous which leads to action. However, unlike the heat of fire or the pain of disease, abstracted stimuli may not lead to an immediate or ameliorative response: "We do not persuade a man to avoid danger. We can only persuade him that a given situation is dangerous and that he is using the wrong means of avoiding it" (150). Dystopian scenarios name that danger, and are, as the chapter titled "permanence and change" suggest, secular prophecies, new orientations toward the present and toward history in toto. Burke further suggests that even new discoveries can quickly become dystopic landscapes: "Such is the case with those elaborate regimens of social diet which we build up by a slowly selective process until certain ills gain prominence and authority enough to grow self sustaining or creative. These ills become powers in themselves, leading us on to still further interests, all farther and farther afield from our original patterns of humane gratification" (182). Even here, Burke's instinct seems to be to warn, to extrapolate, and to predict an unwelcome social condition.

What does it mean that Burke has (apparently) this occupational psychosis? These connections are obvious to me, because I spend most of my time thinking about apocalypse. For some reason, I am preconditioned--and, it seems to me Burke is preconditioned--by the linguistic texture in which I find myself, embedded in a set of terms and relationships that allows me to ascribe meaning (and thus cause and effect) to a given situation, to a given interpretation of a situation. The dystopian motive--that is, that which moves us to prevent dystopic situations--includes assumptions about motive, rhetoric, and human progress in general. While I've only managed to highlight Burke's dystopian imagination in two of his books here, the impulse to analyze and persuade by extrapolating to a worse case scenario remains central in most of Burke's work. In his own words, this appears to be his "attitude towards history"--and it is, despite the warnings of failure and totalitarianism, essentially a comic one, oriented toward hope. I will end with Burke's own satiric prayer: Envoi: Nocturne With Noise:

Spring springs among us, on this sod,

Spring vs. Total Fall

And may there be some kind of God,

that He have mercy on us technologic all.

Works Cited Burke, Kenneth. Counter-Statement. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968. ---. Permanence and Change: AN Anatomy of Purpose. 3rd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. --- "Toward Helhaven: A Vision in Three Stages." On Human Nature: A Gathering While Everything Flows, 1967-1984. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. 54-65. Works Referenced Booker, M. Keith. The Dystopian Impulse in Modern Literature. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994. Rabkin, Eric. "Introduction". The End of the World. Eds Eric Rabkin, Martin Greenberg, Joseph Olander. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1983.

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

Sticks and Stones

Sticks and stones will break your bones, but words will fuck you up, too.

From Burke's PLF.
Social structures give rise to "type" situations, subtle subdivisions of the relationships involved in competitive and cooperative acts (293-4). But are these structures deterministic? (de-term-inistic). Do they determine our response?

In what ways are all situations rhetorical?

Not determinative, but presupposes the appropriate action(s). The situation itself provides modes of conduct and possible names for it. But the "situation" is made up of audiences, "places" (which are created by the people around them), "historical facts" (which are the perceptions of the people recording them). The situation is a container for action.

Sunday, May 13, 2007

Blogging my way through Counter-Statement

As part of the Prelude to Prelims Summer, I will be rereading the Burkeian corpus--as much as I can, anyway. We begin, as always, with Counter-Statement

Burke's Preface sets up an opposition between "pamphleteering" ("Leaning") and inquiry, but "He may not be wholly satisfied by the thought of doing exclusively either." (vii)
Burke on composition: "Once he has pamphleteered, however, dare he not in revision try, even at the risk of cancelling himself, to transform the contentious into the reflective?" (viii)
On what art does: "Art's very accumulation (its discordant voices arising out of many systems) serves to undermine any one rigid scheme of living--and herein lies 'wickedness' enough" (viii). If LeGuin is right, and that dystopia is stagnation and rigidness, then art really is the answer.

3 key words: Perhaps, Norm, and Form. “The quest of the ‘norm’ led to a study of the varied ways in which men seek by symbolic means to make themselves at home in social tensions.” (xi). And of course it’s a quest, an adventure that’s usually fruitless undertaken by only the heroic few. And of course he’s worried about the symbolic already, and the comfort it provides. “At home” is an interesting phrase, since the home itself can be a social tension.
Two ways to see art and society: The “censorship” principle and the “lightening rod” principle (xii). Burke quickly connects the censorship principle to Plato’s Republic, where as Aristotle’s Poetics gets put in opposition as the lightening rod. Of course, we know the two men had differing opinions about mimesis in art (“‘Censorship’ implies a one-to-one ratio between art and society” xii), about “real” versus “ideal” and that, I think is why Burke divides them here. However, I wonder if it is wise to always look for Plato’s [Socrates’] opposite in Aristotle, as though the two were the polar ends of some continuum. They are far more similar than they are different, but it looks like I’ll have to go back to the Poetics to rediscover the nuances I seem to have forgotten.
Burke, unsurprisingly, links the Platonic fear of mimesis to totalitarianism, which he contrasts with “the ‘liberal’ point of view” (xii). Art is a type of purification, a release valve for tension in society (drawing the energy away from harm, like a lightening rod). To me, this scheme seems much more totalitarian: Art is used to quell our rebellious instincts, to calm the would-be revolutionaries. Let them mosh at punk concerts, and they won’t cause a real revolution. “…society is protected in the long run only by the more liberal principle” (xii). But protection just might be the problem, if we are protecting or conserving a culture that is unhealthy or just plain immoral (cough, Iraq war, cough). After all, he says he does not mean that there is “any hope in mass hysterias engineered by demagogues who are in turn assisted by efficient controls over the channels of information and communication” (i.e. The Current Administration and Fox News). And yet if we use Burke’s “liberal” art to quell the masses, then such demagogues are never removed from power. Dystopias work not because they comfort us as art, but because they enflame us, make us afraid. While Burke’s Rhetoric of Motives seems to promote the Liberal view (art as comfort, as a symbolic means of working out present tensions), dystopian fiction utilizes the emotions such an attitude allows (for the censorship mode wouldn’t even allow dystopian fiction to be written) to disquiet its readers into action. It’s not mimesis, but the desire to avoid mimesis that drives the rhetorical mechanisms of dystopian fiction.
“The sort of fear I had in mind, for example, concerned the attitude toward the ‘promises’ of applied science. More and more people, in recent years, are coming to realize that technology can be as ominous as it is promising. Such fear, if properly rationalized, is but the kind of discretion a society should have with regard to all new powers” (xiii) Burke’s dystopianism appears here. His dependency on “rationalization” however, is as problematic as the rationalization promoted by the dystopian novels of the era he was writing in (40s-60s). Later dystopias dismiss rationality and rationalization as a means of power itself (a la Foucault).
More dystopian Burke appears in his mention of his reaction to Capeks’ R.U.R. which he found frightening because it imagined not an extraterrestrial force, but an “invader already here, from within” causing the destruction of humanity. He decides that “the high development fo modern technology might change the rules somewhat; accordingly, conditions that are ‘normal’ to our society would probably have been fatal to societies in which there was a much smaller percentage of technology” (x). The phraseology here catches me every time; I’ve got it all marked up in my book. First, he decides that technology isn’t all bad, that it has “changed the rules” but only ‘somewhat.” What rules those are, he is not clear. Rules of relationships between people? Of art? Of rhetoric? What does technology normalize today that would have been fatal to, say, medieval people? (Stargate tries to answer this, I think). What does it mean, also, to have a society classified by its “percentage” of technology? What “percentage” are we now, I ask, as I sit in Starbucks, listening to a CD, while typing on a laptop onto a one gig thumbdrive smaller than my actual thumb as baristas use security TVs to watch cars approach the drive through? Percentages are ratios, X to Y. So a percentage of technology would be the ratio of technology to…what? People? Humanity? Culture? Nature? What is the whole from which he is taking a part? What opposition is he setting up when he makes this division? What happens when we hit 100%?

Chapter 1. Three Adepts of ‘Pure’ Literature
This chapter concerns three writers who have some relationship to Realism or Realist literature. Burke examines each writer (Flaubert, Pater and DeGourmont) for what they can tell us about literature’s relationship to audiences, to society, and to constructedness of sentences how “unornamented” or “arhetorical” (well, seemingly arhetorical) the prose seems to be.
Someone should compare Burke’s comments on Flaubert with Derrida’s. Not me.
Flaubert was looking for a “pure” art, uncontaminated by social ties, one that seemed to lack “method” or mechanics. Burke is especially interested that Flaubert chose to use the form of “novel” to attempt this purification, because it is the genre “in which glitter is most an obstacle, the genre wherein one can be rhetorically brilliant only by subterfuge, or by endangering the purity of one’s effect” (7). Or, more clearly, “The novel makes of literature the verbalization of experience, the conversion of life into diction” (7). If Flaubert really wanted to do a verbal art without social implications, a Non Realist art for art’s sake, he should have chosen a different genre!
“An author who lives most of his live in his head must perform his transgressions on paper” (24). Or, a blog?

Thursday, January 19, 2006

Watt Part 2

The link above has nothing to do with Ian Watt, novels, or the 18th Century. It does, however, take you to the online edition of The Bloody Theatre, or, the Martyrs Mirror of the Defenseless Christians, Who Baptized Only Upon Confession of Faith, and Who Suffered and Died for the Testimony of Jesus, Their Saviour, From the Time of Christ to the Year A.D. 1660 Complied Ffrom Various Authentic Chronicles, Memorials, and Testimonies. Nice title.

     As for Watt: I have a few thoughts which do not go together, and probably never will. First, I can't help but notice how similiar his argument is to that of Kenneth Burke. Both of them find that "both the philosophical and the literary innovations must be seen as parallel manifestations of larger change" (Watt 31)--For "manifestations," insert "symptoms" and you have Burke's idea of literature as arising from a particular Scene, as a "stylized and strategic response" to that scene. What Burke would emphasize about ALL writing ("poetry" he says) is that it is rhetorical in that it tries to create identifications and identity. When Watt talks about "the various technical characteristics" of the novel, of the "stylistic [classical] tradition of fiction" that the novel does not have, of the novel's "break [...] with the accepted canons of prose style" (27-29), he is forgetting that those very stylistic changes are rhetorical changes. If literature is a stylized response, a change in style is a change in argument. It is not enough to simply state that "the" novel breaks with traditional style; we must now identify that style and what it does. Style, as much as content, determines reception and Attitude changes in the audience.


     Which is why it is important to rethink Watt's statement on the novel's structure: "What is often felt as the formlessness of the novel, as compared, say, with tragedy or the ode, probably follows from this: the poverty of the novel's formal conventions would seem to the the price it must pay for its realism" (13). There are MANY problems with this statement. To begin with, let me point to all of the economics metaphors Watt uses: "poverty," "price to pay," later, "cost of," etc. While I realize that writing is a commodity, the language of impovershment seems inappropriate for some reason--I guess I'll work that out later.


      More importantly, however, is his claim that the novel does not quite meet the standards of tragedy. While the novel form is "freer" in a sense, over time it has become formalized. In fact, if I remember correctly, some of the Formalists claimed that there is little difference between Greek and novel plot lines. There is more variance allowed, but that variance is still held to conventions. In fact, as I have argued to death, dystopian and utopian novels have a fairly fixed structure that has only begun to be experimented with. There are stock characters, predictable tragic heroes, journeys home, etc. I'm not sure why Watt thinks there is no form to the novel: Pamela and Moll Flanders are both about the struggles of a pretty girl and her ability to work through those struggles using her wits (Moll being a phystical actor, Pamela working symbolically). Both meet some older woman who is corrupt and helps them see inside the cagey world of working women. Both learn lessons about deception. They may take different approaches, but both end up in the same damn place: at home, with a husband and a child, happily ever after. In the end, the women reading the novel are no different than Moll or Pamela: they do not need to go out and experience this themselves because Moll and Pam have shown that no matter what we do, we all end up alike. And that's a comfort. And it's a form. How else could we have a tragic novel?


Take that.


      The epistilary form of Pamela (and lots of others) lends itself to Kenneth Burke's idea of identification and consubstantiality. The best rhetoric--the only rhetoric--depends on the rhetor's ability to create an identification between himself and his audience. Because writing lacks the immediacy of speech (shut up Derria), because the speaker is absent, identification must be got by other means than mere presence and proximity. The temporal realism of Pamela allows us to move with her (as Richardson's mouthpiece), to be connected to her in time, if not space. While it makes for strange reading if you think about it too hard, the temporal proximity makes up for the lack of action. Pamela is about words, about argumentation, about a woman's ability to speak when silenced, symbolically act when unable to effect change elsewhere. Because of this, not much "happens," but due to the presence the text purports, we do not feel the drag of mere conversation between made up people. It's like a soap opera (or Battlestar Galactica, or InuYasha)--the speech matters only because we are already connected to the speakers.


      Why is Watt's framework still present after nearly 50 years? Why do we still feel the need to at least read it, if not address it? Even I, not knowing anything about the field, felt drawn to his book. First, I think, he is the first person to take the novel seriously, as a work of art. Secondly, he, like Burke, seems to be ahead of his time, in attributing cultural factors to the novel's rise (whether or not he got it right doesn't matter to me as much as the fact that he does not give the Romantic argument of "spontaneous overflow of emotion" for invention). His argument is difficult to breach; he argues that causality as a topoi is ever present in the novel, and this is the very topoi he uses (novels were caused by X, Y, Z). If you accept one part of his argument, you feel compelled by the rest. In linking philosophy to literature, he adds to his ethos and logos. His pathos is lacking, but it usually is in this type of writing.


      In the end, however, Watt gives us a starting place, something to hold onto as a master narrative. The Romantic narratives still hold today; we should not be surprised that this one is equally compelling. Watt's text acts as an island to stand on in the ocean of data, the sea of text and context. It is an organizing principle where there were none before. In creating his framework, he has accomplished a monumental, albeit probably incomplete, task: he's managed to give us a leg to stand on. To not address that leg as we add others would be to try to build a building from the top down. Even if the newer theories and criticism end up undoing Watt, they must first return to Watt to, as Burke says, return the terms to the molten center, where terms are at play and ideas are indefinite (pun intended).


      As for the Martyrs Mirror: Is it literature? Gerald's language seems to imply that it is, at least, somewhat fictive, somewhat in a "story" mode. That, however, does not literature make, according to Derrida. Burke, however, says that any symbolic performance is "poetry" when it does something, when it responds to something. Which stance shall I take?


What, then, shall we do?

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Blogging the Novel--Hunter, part 1

Some thoughts on J. Paul Hunter's "The novel and social/cultural history," to be revisited later

I enjoyed Hunter's piece, probably because it's the first cultural studies like item I've read in a while. His concerns are my concerns, his assumptions are my assumptions...but I, of course, have this little Burke in my head (the Parliament of Voices seems to be ruled by one short rhetorician...)

Hunter begins with the assumption that "Novels [...] explicitly render manners, habits, customs, and beliefs that differ from culture to cutlure, and they depend heavily on the particulars of time and place" (10). As I noted in my Watt entry, both time and place are essential to the argumentative force of the text. But what is it that novels argue for?

Hunter also states that the early novels are readable "even if you know nothing of the history of their time and place, but often conflicts in the plot--and subtle differences between different characters--derive from the interpretations of desires, needs, and values that are culturally based" (10). I would argue that it is not subtle at all--that those particulars of the place are essential for the defamiliarization aspect of the rhetoric of fiction. That those who read the novels without the same understandings as the audience of the original context are reading an entirely different novel, and that novel has an entirely different rhetorical effect. In fact, it may no longer be a "novel" at all, for the readers in the new context. Because the novel bases its identifications in the particular, not the universal, the consubstantiality among author/narrator and reader changes as time and place change.

In other words, 1984 may not be a dystopian novel any more. Texts within a genre can be re-ordered as their function within a culture shifts. This is one of the wonderful things about the printed text; as Derrida points out, texts now outlive their contexts--writing anticipates death. Pamela no longer incites young women to social subversion. Pamela is now so legitimated within the academy that it cannot have the same representative anecdote. I'm not even sure if there is a representative anecdote for 21st century readers, unless those readers are aware of Pamela's context.

While Hunter never uses Burkeian phrases, I find Burkeian ideas throughout (big surprise). When he states that our view of the 18th century was once "appealing for its escapism in the midst of World War I" he acknowledges the Symbolic Action of the narratives we create.

Sunday, November 20, 2005

Complexity, Chaos and Catastrophe

Book: The Moment of Complexity: Emerging Network Culture. Mark Taylor.

Amy's Thoughts: Oh, for the love of all angst.

I've been trying to read this book all day. It culminated with a call to dear old Dad, who kindly explained chaos theory to me. Which I get. I really do. It's based in two premises: All systems have an inherent order and that any change to any part of the system, no matter how small, can cause huge, giant, catastrophic effects. (This is different from the so called "Catastrophe theory" which has something to do with nonlinear systems wherein resulting values make "quantum leaps" for certain given initial values plugged into an equation.)
And I get that within these systems, we cannot account for individual behavior, but the whole we can explain.
The idea of "Complexity" seems to blend the two, asking us to reconsider the second part of premises of chaos theory; instead of a single change introjected into a system, Taylor posits a series of overarching social changes that build up. The system remains stable, self-conserving, constant until a quantum moment where the critical mass of "newness" creates a change.
For Taylor, this newness began appearing in 1968. A lot happened that year. Chaos theory was invented (discovered? Articulated?). Derrida got massively popular. Some bad stuff went down in the South. More bad stuff happened in Vietnam. People began figuring out that the structures of structuralism could be a little scary in their oppositions. For Taylor, the "leap" (my words) happened in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Literal barriers between oppositions (east/west, communism/capitalism) were torn down brick by brick. And hovering in the background (or perhaps the cause? or the effect?) were new communication systems just ready to change us all. CNN, for one. The Internet was made public. And the happy, categorizing grids of structuralism got bent into the wire frames for fractals that are unpredictable. Yeah. And my generation was just learning long division and cursive writing. We're a new breed alright. We've got a new sense of communication, networking, persuasion, movement of individuals. We are fluid, as is our information (and our sense of what counts as information).
This is the new paradigm of theory? This is replacing poststructuralism? Isn't it a bit too utopian? My generation is still controlled by binary oppositions; it's stuck in our language. And what the hell does this have to do with Burke?
I could make some connections. Burke likes systems. The Grammar is his ultimate critical system for understanding human motives. But within that system of human motives, which we can describe as consisting of Act, Agent, Agency, Scene, and Purpose, we cannot predict the action of an individual, only use the terms of the system to describe what happened after the fact. We can show how the system of the "Human Barnyard" requires patterns of behavior as a whole, but cannot predict the movements of any one "wordling." Burke reminds us that language matters; his discussion of behaviorism reminds us that humans, unlike animals, choose options based on our understanding of the world as filtered through language (also a system, and much harder to break).
But, if we take the idea of systems seriously (which postmodernists would rather not), we can say that average persons will respond to stimulous X within the system in a given way, because we have seen it before. And we can even probably say that we know the limitations of the system, how much change it can hold before it collapses under the newness. The predictablility of this can lead us to create very effective rhetoric.
But isn't the purpose of rhetoric to incite change? To move a people? To do something new? Perhaps (and this is the dystopian/utopian problem) the system must have some amount of newness/change--perhaps the system is ready for such a movement, and even requires it (think of Matrix: Reloaded here). That to preserve our current democracy, we must have revolutionary, dystopian rhetoric, which reminds us just how bad things could get.
Burke says as much, when he says such rhetorics are largely conservative. What is being conserved is the system as it is now. We don't want a revolution; we want to maintain equillibrium.
And not all systems are chaotic, Dad points out. But that type of determinism, totalitarianism is too much for a humanist like me. I want to believe that I have the choice to move, even if it is within the system, even if the system requires it.
And where does that leave us Christians? Free Will? The Eschaton, where all systems everywhere collapse, unless you consider that right now we are in the largest, most complex system ever, moving according to Her/His equation, looping from beginning to end to beginning again until the ultimate moment of complexity arises, and S/He leads us to that next quantum leap into a new system.

Then what?


It doesn't say what happens after the thousand years, after the new heaven and new earth. "After," is, after all, a human idea based on a linear understanding of time. time feels linear; i won't get any sleep tonight.

What does this have to do with Burke and fanfiction and multiple interpretatins? Of laycriticism? Of rhetoric, and representative anecdotes and symbolic action and stylized, strategic responses to situations?

I don't know.

If you know, please post a comment! Or, you know, write my paper for me! Your Choice! Free will served up daily on unwiredmascot.blogspot.com!

Monday, October 10, 2005

A bag of mixed nuts

      Somewhere in here I should post about my teaching this week. The confidence I gain when planning activities is usually enough to sustain me through actually doing the activities. Usually. I'm much better at creating activities than seeing them through, though.
      I wasn't surprised when my plans for Tuesday were met with confusion and silence. At least I managed to do more whole-class activity and discussion; until now, it's been small groups. Talking in a large group always scared me as a freshman (okay, only the first semester), and I don't want to shut down conversation. However, it's getting harder for me to monitor several small groups at once; I must be losing my touch.
      Doc Henry taught us a lot in journalism class in high school...some of it was perhaps not quite ethical. Gather information however you can. It was in this way that I decided to learn to read upside down, to eavesdrop even better than what Mom taught me in all the endless doctors' offices, to put people at ease by allowing facial expressions to show through, even when those expressions were all an act. Whatever it takes.
      But I seem to be losing some of those "skills." It's probably for the best; I can't be a badger for life. It's probably better for the students--I think I seem less crazy when I'm not standing in the middle of the room with my eyes closed and a smirk on my face. Now I stand off to the side, head tilted puppy-like, and zero-in on one thing at a time.
      It could be that I'm just distracted as of late, by the mass of Burke. It's hard to think about hearing six things at once when Papa KB is echoing. I think I'm channeling a dead rhetorician.
      The cold weather reminds me of football season. This always makes me melancholy, puts me in the mood for Romanticism. Yes. You read that right. That sort of self-centered, makes-no-sense-to-anyone-else stylized and strategic response (damn you KB!) is appropriate for football season. When I think of all my dead bandmates.
      Dead or destroyed, what's the difference? I'm told a large chunk of the military-type went to Iraq. And came back someone else. Destroyed by Iraq, destroyed by Ashland--prisons of our own making. Etc. A bad Creed song goes here. Some are at the county jail. Poo Tee Wheet.
      I'd try to count, but the end number's possible height is too scary. It makes more sense to watch the Classmates.com page change as people die, or enlist, or try to find each other in some weird quarter life desperation.
      Oh, there are births and joys and marriages. I'm sure. But those don't go with football season. Allen Ginsberg's "Howl" does, and when I saw it written in front of Heavilon, I almost burst into tears for no good reason, except that it felt like fall and the best minds of my generation weren't being destroyed, but were destroying themselves.
      Act vs. Agent, Kenny says. The agent/act ratio is very important when we want social change. The right person with the right ability. What should I do about the Scene-Act ratio, Kenny? It's football season, and I keep remembering things I was sure I'd forgotten when I moved to Boston. Like how the Midwest makes me want to run to a new Scene. The Act required of the Scene is a change of Scenery.
      In Boston I never wanted to run. Boston is safe, even as the crowds swarm and people breathe down each other's shirts and the students party forever and ever.
      I'm distracted. And it's not just because my muscles seem to have minds of their own. It's the feel that something is missing--or too present. Absence and presence are the same, right Derrida? Can one be distracted by the fact that one is distracted?
      What goes with what? KB asks. Football and fall and cold air and missing best friends and losing hope and the need to run. They signify each other, so in the fall wind I can't help but feel distracted by things that aren't there now.
      In Boston, the fall was different. It was a New England fall, short and wet and windy, dark by 5 pm. The lack of twilight saved me.
      How do we fix things that are too pious? Papa KB says "perspective by incongruity." That damn confusing preposition in the middle. In Japanese, there are fewer prepositions, and the connections between modifiers and what they modify make more sense to me. I break the piety by symbolically mixing things that don't go together. I symbolically change the equation in hopes that as a symbol-using (symbol-making, symbol-misusing) animal, the associations break accordingly.
      Football should be replaced in spring. Not symbolic death of the season, but life. And the missing best friends, I remind myself, happened in winter, too.
      Your connections are faulty. The binaries at the center don't refer to anything but other words. the centre falls apart; it cannot hold. Can a bad poem be a good symbolic action? Let's find out.

A symbolic of motives
"I love you"
when you are like this, I mean.
When the fall wind is in your hair
and there's nothing to worry about except
plumes and spats and the orange electrical tape
holding my hand together, I love it.
"Oh hold my hand
together" for at least the next nine minutes
and when it starts to bleed, just as they bleed
that we are bleeding together, letting out
the bad spirits making us sick of this town.
"Let's leave together"
To Florida or Hell, or your basement,
it doesn't really matter here at week nine
with Jeff's lips split six ways and my legs
betraying me to the camera.
"I'm never coming home"
Did you even hear me say it over
the victory songs that engulfed us so totally?
It's nice within the music, safe and warm
where we're all shouting together.

Wednesday, September 21, 2005

Permanance and Change

"Piety is the sense of what goes with what."
"Vulgarity is pious."
"[...]the poet, writing of night, puts together all those elements which are his night-thoughts, the things that go wtih night as he knows it [....]"

And what if we draw this out further? That all poets writing of night put together elemnts which are night-thoughts, night as we know it. Because in order for the poem to act upon its readers, there must be some consensus of meaning, some agreed upon set of terms for communication to happen. Night is X and X, we say together, goes with Y. And Z. And Other Letters.

All night poems then would have the same piety. Is this not the same as a genre convention? If, as Burke says, we can fully expect the "villain of a bad drama" to "speak in sibilants," and, as he said in Counter-Statement expectations are what occurs from recurring forms does not piety result in form, eventually?

But when can we say that a generally accepted notion of the pious linking "Villains wear trenchcoats or capes" becomes a formal quality of some larger form, such as "melodrama?" Can a single piety constitue a whole form (genre)? Or must several pieties "in constellation" (Miller) create the genre?

In other words, (in Amy's words), does the presence of the piety "Heros are weak males," which I have identified as one of the conventions of dystopian fiction make the genre what it is? If we remove that piety, is it a different genre? How many does it take to have the desired rhetorical effect?

When we kill the weak hero of the dystopia, are we killing our own weaknesses?

Sunday, September 04, 2005

Counter-Statement statements (part 1)

In no particular order (that would be a valuation I am not ready for)
1. In "The Status of Art" Burke returns to his friends from the first chapter, specifically all those L'art pour l'art dudes. He traces some ideas about utilitarianism in art, and those who would defend the lack of utility by claiming art is a-moral, that is, outside the sphere of moral (and therefore consequential). Art for them is beauty. Beauty, apparently has no use. But isn't this why I started reading Burke in the first place? Because I was trying to figure out why I loved reading dystopias, only to find myself coming to purpose statements? And Burke said it was okay to read literature as purposeful, not just beautiful. That artful words do in fact have social consequences.
2. Eliot, qtd in Burke: "We fight rather to keep something alive than in the expectation that anything will triumph." Isn't this what dystopias do? They fight to preserve the current state, not for us to go overthrow the government of today. Keep alive the "freedoms" as they are, and we do not have anything that must be triumphed over?
3. The symbolists are always appearing in my classes, and I still don't know them like I should; unlike the way 11 dimensions are coiled up in quantum mechanics, I cannot explain them in my own language. The emphasis is on the image and the succession of images, but we are still in language, not visual rhetoric, so the images themselves must be described in a logical, noneliptical manner. The symbolists seem to have something to do with consubstantiality, with identification, as I asserted in my paper on Elizabeth Bishop, but I am still uncertain how Burke would read such progressions across images as rhetoric. ????????
4. The Mass Audience: "Mass market paperback" is a term that has tugged at my consciousness because the connotations attached to it bespeak of bourgeois identity issues. Burke outlines how mass literacy has led to pockets of "real" readers (those interested in "art for art's sake") but that texts have a mass audience. We should not separate them based on the old L'art pour l'art, an idea created for the utilitarianism of the previous century. There may seem to be an elite readership, but we must acknoledge that even non-savvy readers are acquiring the text, and may not even desire to engage in the reading that they are sometimes forced to do.
5. Literature as enthymetical argument? Burke compares a book's argument and need fulfillment properties to that of a politician's proposal for change. A book does not have to reveal the root of the problem; the premise can be left unstated, almost intuitive. A politician must, however, make explicit his desires and appeals for the best results. A book can fulfill our need for nature without pointing to our current dissatisfaction. A politician cannot propose a beutifying plan without pointing to the squallor of the city. Does that make literature more subversively suasatory because it is missing one premise that we all are already in identification with? (Random question without answers?)

Wednesday, August 31, 2005

That's not My Kenny

Reading CounterStatement
by the light of the laptop
by the glow of the Chemistry building
was not particularly Enlightening

Who is this man
who can yet speak of essences?
Who presents even criticism
without a hint of what's to come?

Tell me, Kenny,
please pun on the word "novel"
or tell me that the arguments
share the same lava flow.

This presentation belies you;
your certainty me fait peur,
and only your assumptions of my readership
let me know it's you

Inside the text
peeking out to reframe the white margins
There you are, on page 16, defining simple words
I thought I knew: Pure and art

And PreRaphaelite dreams
"Art was 'justified' because art
was an appetite--in being desired,
it found its reason for existence."

And, "inevitably" this all ends up
in the Church and Sex
"A people more direct in its religion
would divide and subdivide its divinities"

The immutable is important because
it adds to our lexicon of Flux
Countering, changing, adding, synthesis,
antithesis; it's the Other that show us Us

What is aesthetic?
I know what it is, but does he?
there's spirit and material
l'art pour l'art--sublime beauty or something

Lots of Ofs to link two words
Rhetoric of Motives, Aesthetic of Symbolism
the Name of Decadence.
The futility of the human race as a Whole.

If anything, our art should be like water
the arguments sliding over each other sensually
replacing each other like one ice skate
after the other to trace a figure 8.

An author ...must preform his transgressions
on paper (two divergent legs molten at the core
must cross and be relieved of control
or we all fall down)

Monday, August 29, 2005

Blogging Burke--scattered Essay of Doom Theory

It had to happen Sometime, so it might as well be Now: Reading All of Burke.
Yes, it is daunting, which is probably why we aren't doing it. Not all, that is. But most.
The thing about Burke is that he and I write and think alike, "strangely" recursive, reflexive, revising without erasing. Each concept reappearing in each book in a different form, a kaleidescope of the idea. It makes more sense to read Burke conceptually, not chronologically.
That, however, is difficult to do unless you already have read Burke chronologically. Which is why tonight I'm starting in on the First, Counter-Statement a title which reveals very little.
To help I have none other than Professor Dave Blakesley's book called "Elements of Dramatism." That title reveals very little; one might think it is simply an overview of Burke's Dramatism. But Blakesly recognizes (of course!) that in order to understand the system Burke finally ended up with (or, simply ended with due to old age?) requires knowing the steps Burke took to arrive at that hexad/pentad.
Every time I read "pentadic" I think it says "pedantic"
Reading "Elements" on the bus today, I realized some things.
When Burke talks about "imaginative works" as providing ways for writers to answer Big Life Questions that arise from the writer's (creator's?)current situation, he is talking about the representative anecdote (almost) described in the Grammar. The two ideas are inexorably linked: The representative anecdote is the result of the writings that are done in order to symbolically react to a situation. The situation is defined by the writer (the writer gets to frame it according to his/her past interpreations of OTHER representative anecdotes s/he's read) so as to provide an interpretation for other readers in similar situations. That interpretation is the representative anecdote, the "equipment for living" that literature provides.
Subjectivity, then, is not only the author's own self, but the interpretations that help him or her create new interpretations. At this point, if you're still reading my blog, you must know some Burke. Who gives a damn? Indeed.
Why worry about interpretations borne of interpretations? What the hell does that have to do with ANYTHING in the corpus of Amylea-dom?
I've been working this "Essay of Doom" for a few months now, getting down thoughts, noting theories or criticism that may come in handy, etc. You may notice I have uncharacteristically avoided Burke. Instead, I've been recursively revisiting the same ideas through different frameworks, hoping to arrive at the answer to "Why is Fan Fiction so alluring?"
Perhaps I was not using the right word? "Alluring" is close. Others I've used: Attractive, interesting (ew!), engaging, popular, involved...I'm sure there are others. That's not the point. I was missing one, one which triggers giant neon signs and fake animated idea light bulbs over the heads of lit crit people:
Desire
Why is it desirable? Desire, as the Freudian mechanism (eros, blah blah, need fulfillment, blah blah), desire as the Derridian deferral of (of WHAT?) pleasure (or meaning), desire as the trace where we almost get to the meaning, we want pure communication of angels, we are so close to being linked, but...
we are denied. The desire multiplies from this denial/deferal. We want more.
Blakesly interprets Burke's "syllogistic progression/form" via examples of arguments we're used to, namely, mystery novels and academic thesis on top essays. In these forms, we are given several pieces of "prior knowledge" to consider (oooh, I'm working in Ed Psych stuff!) which make us desire some end to all these proofs. "Where are you going with this?" we ask our composition students. "How does X lead to Y?" We desire to reach that end, the completion of the argument, and consent consubstantiality with the writer in order to achieve that end, to be "gratified by the sequence." It's a familiar form, we know how (or at least that it ends. We join the author in following the clues to generate conclusions.
This is lovely, and I would have missed the real loveliness of it had Blakesly not given his last example: "Television soap operas rely on such a form [Syllogistic], but in their case, the progression is unresolved; they must keep going and going (and therein is their lure)" (57). The defered desire that both Derrida and Freud note as a key to human action comes from the form (can I say "genre" in this case?).
Let me take this to my own interests before I begin waxing tangental on the problematics of genre and Burke. Mother often tells me that anime is no different from soap operas. I want to scoff, but know better; both are serial and seemingly unending. While most soap operas have yet to end, animes do. Manga do. And that's a big problem for all of us desire defering people.
Most of the popular anime in America, in fact, are already over in Japan. A big exception was, until recently, Inuyasha, and in that case, the manga continues. Because manga are more difficult for most of the US (those not living in cities, that is) to acquire, anime is the medium most popular for these serials. Anime is more difficult to continue, though, due to budget restrictions and TV ratings, and tend to end after a few seasons while the manga may or may not continue on afterward (an additional 100 chapters of Inuyasha have already been written past the "end" of the anime).
What do we do when we are given a conclusion? Particularly one that is not at all satisfying? Inuyasha ends with much of the plot unresolved, sexual tension still not released, and the bad guy still alive. If we wish to make Inuyasha a representative anecdote, to let it give us instructions for living, then our lives seem very bleak indeed--we are stuck in limbo with Inuyasha and the gang, unable to move beyond episode 167.
Fanfiction seems to do several things in light of this small section of Burkean prose, depending on the genre of the fic. One, the "continuation" fics (Media Miner genre label) allows us to move beyond the "end" of the series, or, in many cases, imagine that end. Two, as "interpretations of interpreations" that will help readers with their own interpretations, fanfics help writers symbolically mediate those confusing things in life, and work out--in fiction, symbollically--possible answers. Writers who make characters that seem particularly OOC are usually using the fic to answer questions via role playing: What if Inuyasha started feeling attracted to males? What if Kagome decided to stop being so forgiving? What if they weren't in Japan, but the US? These questions lead to some of the more improbable fan fics, but at the same time, are probably the most useful fics for us to analyze here; they are less of an explication of the original series than an explication of the "writer's situation."
Another possibility is that some are tired of defering the fulfillment of desire. In the Harry Potter fan universe, as well as Inuyasha, the "final battle" is a subject that is almost a genre of its own. (Note to self: All fan fiction is AU by necessity because we can never know where the author would have gone/is going (again, the terminal end metaphor!)) The end is written because the author takes the fulfillment into his/her own hands. Is there some sort of breaking point? Did anyone imagine the final Inuyasha battle before, say, episode 100? A critical mass of deferal?
If we want to think of other fan fiction actions ("Genre as social action"), the "original" category is interesting (again, an mm.org genre). In this genre, the stories are set in the middle of the series and seek to explore/exploit those moments the author has left open to interpretation. While PWP stands for "Plot? What Plot?" in so called "lemon" fics, in the "original" genre, there is often a TWT bent--"Time line? What Time Line?" The tongue in cheek manner with which the authors treat the adherance of their fic to the canon time line points to a different social action than simply fulfilling some desire within a conclusion: instead, there is further deferal of conclusions, but a satisfaction of questions about character. I'll have to read Counter-Statement, but I'm willing to bet Burke addresses this kind of symbolic action, where form satisfies something other than an end
Note: See ffn, mm.org and checkmated.com for stories that emerged just prior to and just after the release of Harry Potter VI. How do the authors situate themselves in this new situation?